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The Irish State is being asked to explain its role in the Troubles. | :00:14. | :00:17. | |
We certainly feel that the Irish Government could have done a lot | :00:17. | :00:23. | |
more to stop the campaign of genocide that was happening in | :00:23. | :00:26. | |
Fermanagh, Tyrone, South Armagh and Londonderry as well. Unionists | :00:26. | :00:29. | |
return to this and try to claim that if it wasn't for the Irish | :00:29. | :00:34. | |
Government there wouldn't have been the IRA campaign. I think it is | :00:34. | :00:38. | |
what-about-ery. There is no memory whatever of collusion between the | :00:38. | :00:43. | |
Irish State, passive or active, and the IRA. My party was totally, | :00:43. | :00:46. | |
totally against the use of violence in achieving their political aims. | :00:46. | :00:52. | |
Totally, 100%, 101%. Next time I'm in Dublin I certainly will be | :00:52. | :00:56. | |
talking about these matters. issue of the Irish State's attitude | :00:56. | :01:01. | |
and actions have also been thrown centre stage by a tribunal in | :01:01. | :01:09. | |
Dublin investigating allegations that Gardai colluded with the IRA. | :01:09. | :01:19. | |
:01:19. | :01:48. | ||
Will Ireland answer a unionist call to apologise for... The British | :01:48. | :01:53. | |
Army suffered its biggest loss of life in the Troubles when two bombs | :01:53. | :01:57. | |
were detonated here in the North, from across the water in the south. | :01:57. | :02:01. | |
Throughout the Troubles, questions were raised about the Irish State's | :02:01. | :02:07. | |
role. As unionists complained the republic provided a sanctionary for | :02:07. | :02:13. | |
on the run terrorists. As politicians contest the past, the | :02:13. | :02:17. | |
history of the Troubles can appear an exercise in what-about-ery. To | :02:17. | :02:21. | |
the next generation the question, what about allegations of Irish | :02:21. | :02:27. | |
State collusion with the IRA, may come to appear it no more than the | :02:28. | :02:32. | |
obvious rejoineder to cries of what about British collusion with | :02:32. | :02:42. | |
:02:42. | :02:51. | ||
It was as a result of political negotiations at Weston Park over a | :02:51. | :02:54. | |
decade ago that a number of inquiries into alleged British and | :02:54. | :03:01. | |
Irish collusion were set up. In Dublin, one of those inquiries, led | :03:01. | :03:05. | |
by judge Peter Smithwick has been examining claims of gardai | :03:05. | :03:10. | |
collusion in the IRA murder two of police officers. Chief | :03:10. | :03:12. | |
Superintendent Harry Breen and Border Superintendent Bob Buchanan | :03:12. | :03:17. | |
were travelling back across the border after a meeting with their | :03:17. | :03:22. | |
Irish gardai counterparts in Dundalk on March 20, 1989. They | :03:22. | :03:32. | |
were ambushed by a gang of IRA gunmen. What is this? Reverse, | :03:32. | :03:42. | |
:03:42. | :03:49. | ||
They were the two most senior policemen murdered during the | :03:49. | :03:54. | |
Troubles. I was meant to the in the car. Harry and I were going down | :03:54. | :03:57. | |
that morning. Alan Mains was Harry Breen's staff officer, but his | :03:57. | :04:02. | |
place on the trip to Dundalk was taken instead by Bob Buchanan. | :04:02. | :04:06. | |
Officers Breen and Buchanan went to Dundalk to discuss a possible | :04:06. | :04:12. | |
operation against Thomas Slab Murphy, who they identified as IRA | :04:12. | :04:18. | |
chief in South Armagh. Harry Breen had been worried about travelling | :04:18. | :04:23. | |
there because he suspected some guards had links to the IRA. He had | :04:23. | :04:27. | |
a lot of reservations about it. You know, I think it was more to do | :04:27. | :04:33. | |
with the fact that it was Murphy and he did mention his concerns, | :04:33. | :04:38. | |
clearly to me, at the time, about the fact that people were on, in | :04:38. | :04:44. | |
Harry's opinion, were on the pay roll of Slab Murphy from the | :04:44. | :04:47. | |
Guardian. Harry Breen also knew he was among the IRA's top targets, | :04:47. | :04:51. | |
after he appeared in the media following the SAS SAS ambush at | :04:51. | :04:56. | |
Loughall in which eight IRA men had been killed. | :04:56. | :05:01. | |
NEWSREEL: The weapons are very high-powered. It's evident that not | :05:01. | :05:09. | |
only did the terrorists intend to destroy the station, but also to | :05:09. | :05:17. | |
kill any of the ok ue paints in the -- occupants in the station. It was | :05:17. | :05:22. | |
a serious set back to the RUC. was a significant blow with | :05:22. | :05:26. | |
especially Harry. He would have had tremendous knowledge as a Constable | :05:26. | :05:31. | |
in Crossmaglen, right through to being a Chief Superintendent for | :05:31. | :05:35. | |
the division. There was probably nothing that he didn't know in | :05:35. | :05:37. | |
terms of personalities within the Provisional IRA. The question has | :05:37. | :05:42. | |
always been, how did the IRA know that two policemen were on the road | :05:42. | :05:49. | |
that day? Specifically, was there a leak from Dundalk Gardai Station? | :05:49. | :05:54. | |
Harry Breen's staff arranged the 34509ing in Dundalk by phone only | :05:54. | :06:04. | |
:06:04. | :06:06. | ||
hours before took place at 2.0 Peter Mandelson --2.00pm. On the | :06:06. | :06:12. | |
day itself between 9.00 am and 10.15 am several phone calls | :06:12. | :06:16. | |
occurred. Firming up the arrangements. Just over an hour | :06:16. | :06:22. | |
after these calls, around 11.30 am. It's understood that British Army | :06:22. | :06:25. | |
listening devices in South Armagh picked up a rush of IRA | :06:25. | :06:29. | |
communications. Was this the start of the preparation for the IRA | :06:29. | :06:33. | |
attack? If it was, how did the IRA know to get ready when only a | :06:33. | :06:37. | |
handful of people in Newry and Dundalk police stations say they | :06:37. | :06:41. | |
knew about the meeting? The officers' car couldn't have been | :06:41. | :06:46. | |
spotted before, this because they didn't leave Newry until after | :06:46. | :06:50. | |
1.30pm. The question the tribunal is obviously addressing very | :06:50. | :06:58. | |
directly is, whether or not the Provisional IRA had information | :06:58. | :07:04. | |
beyond 10.10/10.15 am that the men were coming? Expert witnesses have | :07:04. | :07:10. | |
said that to spot the officers' carat 1.30pm and mount the huge | :07:10. | :07:15. | |
operation just after 3.30pm would surely have been impossible. The | :07:15. | :07:24. | |
IRA was either already covering the roads or tipped off about the trip | :07:24. | :07:34. | |
Journalists Chris Ryder, says republican terrorists viewed the | :07:34. | :07:39. | |
South as a hiding place from security forces in Northern Ireland. | :07:39. | :07:43. | |
Dundalk at one stage was known as Gundalk. Many people who left | :07:43. | :07:48. | |
Northern Ireland to avoid justice went on the run and stayed on the | :07:48. | :07:54. | |
run in the Republic of Ireland. They generally felt that it was a | :07:54. | :08:00. | |
safe haven. It is a view shared by General Sir John Wilsey, a former | :08:00. | :08:05. | |
head of the British Army in Northern Ireland. A successful | :08:05. | :08:08. | |
terrorist organisation must have a safe border behind which to shelter. | :08:08. | :08:12. | |
You must have a population or a community or an area or a base | :08:12. | :08:17. | |
which is protected and safe. This man, known as Kevin Fulton, | :08:18. | :08:22. | |
appeared before the Tribunal and said he was a former British Army | :08:22. | :08:26. | |
agent. He infill straited the IRA's South Down unit. The engineering | :08:26. | :08:31. | |
and the bomb make woog have been 99% based in the south. Had you no | :08:31. | :08:35. | |
RUC or covert army units running around. You made bombs and they | :08:35. | :08:40. | |
went all over Northern Ireland. They would have gone up as far ace | :08:40. | :08:42. | |
as Derry/Londonderry, Belfast, North Down, South Down, they went | :08:42. | :08:47. | |
everywhere, Cookstown. Kevin Fulton is significant because he has given | :08:47. | :08:50. | |
key evidence to the Smithwick Tribunal claiming he was present | :08:50. | :08:53. | |
when a Dundalk guard passed information to the IRA. That | :08:53. | :08:56. | |
evidence was privotal to the inquiry being set up into the | :08:56. | :09:02. | |
deaths of Breen and Buchanan. But it is also highly controversial. | :09:02. | :09:06. | |
The Tribunal has heard Kevin Fulton described as "an intelligence | :09:06. | :09:12. | |
nuisance", and "a compulsive liar" likely to provide false information. | :09:13. | :09:16. | |
The triebuen hall has though heard that Fulton provided good | :09:16. | :09:21. | |
intelligence on many occasions. Whether or not Smithwick ultimately | :09:21. | :09:24. | |
believes his story, what this inquiry has done is shine a light | :09:24. | :09:34. | |
:09:34. | :09:44. | ||
on the role of the Irish State and Border security was a major point | :09:44. | :09:48. | |
of contention between Britain and Ireland. The bombing at Narrow | :09:48. | :09:57. | |
Water in August 179 brought it into sharp focus. 18 soldiers were | :09:57. | :10:01. | |
killed outside Warrenpoint when the IRA detonated two bombs from across | :10:01. | :10:07. | |
the border, a short distance away. They were in the south. So they | :10:07. | :10:13. | |
were unmolested. They knew they were completely untouched. We could | :10:13. | :10:17. | |
do nothing about it. Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, immediately flew | :10:17. | :10:22. | |
to Northern Ireland and began to pressure the Irish for tougher | :10:22. | :10:26. | |
security. As part of the negotiations for the Anglo Irish | :10:26. | :10:33. | |
Agreement in 1985, better security co-operation led to increased | :10:33. | :10:38. | |
staffing at Dundalk Gardai station. Recently leaked American government | :10:38. | :10:41. | |
cables reveal that Thatcher felt Dublin was still dragging it is | :10:41. | :10:46. | |
feet on security by 1987. She even offered British funding to train | :10:46. | :10:51. | |
Irish police and army in anti- terror tactics. An offer that Irish | :10:51. | :10:56. | |
Justice Minister Gerry Collins says was turned down. It was our | :10:56. | :11:00. | |
responsibility to fulfill or our constitutional obligations. That we | :11:00. | :11:06. | |
did. About We understand that Judge Smithwick has been searching | :11:06. | :11:12. | |
through Thatcher's and Fitzgerald briefing papers for a gardai leak. | :11:12. | :11:18. | |
Rumours about a Dundalk mole were rife. The Tribunal heard that an | :11:18. | :11:27. | |
RUC Special Branch document from that year named a particular guard. | :11:27. | :11:32. | |
The INLA had a big funeral here. These rumours became known in | :11:32. | :11:36. | |
Dundalk itself, says Dan Prenty, who was a Detective Inspector in | :11:36. | :11:41. | |
the town during the 80s, but no-one investigated. It was going on for a | :11:41. | :11:46. | |
long time. Really, it was not much notice was taken of it, to be | :11:46. | :11:55. | |
honest about it. It was never as seenious -- serious enough for a | :11:55. | :12:02. | |
major investigation to be carried out into it. A former Monaghan | :12:02. | :12:06. | |
Chief Superintendent, Tom Curran, told Smithwick that in 197 Bob | :12:07. | :12:14. | |
Buchanan actually asked him to raise concern at Gardai HQ. He said | :12:14. | :12:17. | |
he went to Assistant Commissioner Eugene Crowley and told him that | :12:17. | :12:21. | |
the RUC was concerned that a guard was associating with the IRA. He | :12:21. | :12:26. | |
claimed that Crowley barely looked up from the flies he was reading as | :12:26. | :12:30. | |
sur ran told Smithwick "in a very short time I got the opinion he | :12:30. | :12:38. | |
didn't want to hear it, so I left". Curran also told the Tribunal that | :12:38. | :12:43. | |
Bob Buchanan named the man Owen Corrigan as the guard who links to | :12:43. | :12:47. | |
the IRA. Owen Corrigan was unavailable for this programme. But | :12:47. | :12:54. | |
he is seen here speaking to Spotlight? South Armagh has been | :12:54. | :12:59. | |
part of the Troubles. A unique part of the subversive activity on the | :12:59. | :13:03. | |
border. In a statement before he died Crowley said he had never | :13:03. | :13:06. | |
heard anything about Corrigan. Owen Corrigan is the same guard Kevin | :13:06. | :13:11. | |
Fulton told Smithwick he witnessed passing information to the IRA. | :13:11. | :13:14. | |
Owen Corrigan has strenuously denied all allegations against him. | :13:14. | :13:18. | |
His solicitor points out that he has successfully sued over such | :13:18. | :13:22. | |
allegations in the past. His record has been defended by fellow | :13:22. | :13:26. | |
officers. He has been commended for fighting terrorism, including | :13:26. | :13:31. | |
handing over INLA man, Dominic McGlinchey, to the RUC. His | :13:31. | :13:36. | |
solicitor has evidence to show he was on sick leave at the time Kevin | :13:36. | :13:40. | |
Fulton says he was passing information to the IRA. Two further | :13:40. | :13:46. | |
guards from Dundalk station have come under suspicion too. They also | :13:46. | :13:50. | |
dispute the allegations. The Irish authorities appear to have done | :13:50. | :13:54. | |
very little to investigate a leak. It was only after the Breen and | :13:54. | :13:58. | |
Buchanan murders that they launched an internal investigation. Before | :13:58. | :14:02. | |
that began, just hours after the killings, the RUC and the guards | :14:02. | :14:07. | |
dismissed all claims of a leak. reject any suggestion of that kind. | :14:07. | :14:14. | |
I can say now that categorically the evidence which we have firmly | :14:14. | :14:21. | |
confirms to us that was no mole. Can you indicate... No, not at this | :14:21. | :14:25. | |
time. How could both men have been so sure there was no mole just | :14:25. | :14:30. | |
hours after the murders? A former senior Special Branch officers, and | :14:30. | :14:34. | |
an ex-kept deputy Constable, have told Spotlight, in their experience, | :14:34. | :14:40. | |
they could not have made this call so soon. I think that they had to | :14:40. | :14:45. | |
do that for reassurance reasons, Sir John Hermon would have been | :14:45. | :14:51. | |
mindful of the fact that he could have triggered off a response or | :14:51. | :14:56. | |
retaliation by loyalist elements. Indeed, created a situation where | :14:56. | :15:03. | |
the RUC rank and file would refuse to co-operate with the Gardai. | :15:03. | :15:07. | |
Irish Justice Minister Gerry Collins and Eugene Crowley met and | :15:07. | :15:12. | |
Crowley sent a senior guard to investigate in Dundalk. Before he | :15:12. | :15:16. | |
had even reached Dundalk Gardai station Eugene Crowley had given a | :15:16. | :15:22. | |
statement to say there was no mole in Dundalk Gardai station am, how | :15:22. | :15:26. | |
could Crowley do that? I can't answer that. If Commissioner Eugene | :15:26. | :15:29. | |
Crowley said that, that was the belief he had at the time. Would | :15:29. | :15:32. | |
you think it was strange to make a statement before you had the facts | :15:32. | :15:38. | |
to hand and the report to hand? Again, I can't answer that it was | :15:38. | :15:42. | |
an internal police decision. Smithwick has heard evidence that | :15:42. | :15:46. | |
suggests the gardai investigation was limited in scope. Many officers | :15:46. | :15:50. | |
on the morning shift on the day of the murders were not even | :15:50. | :15:55. | |
questioned. None of those officers were searched down and interviewed. | :15:55. | :16:01. | |
That, to me, would have been one of the most important lines of inquiry. | :16:01. | :16:04. | |
Extraordinarily, the tribunal also heard evidence that the officers | :16:04. | :16:08. | |
who carried outlet investigation were never ordered to investigate a | :16:08. | :16:15. | |
leak, but instead were merely told to establish officers' movements at | :16:15. | :16:19. | |
Dundalk Gardai Station on the day of the murders. So how then cot | :16:19. | :16:22. | |
final report to Eugene Crowley, one month later, confidently state in | :16:22. | :16:29. | |
its conclusion, "there is no leak in Dundalk Gardai Station"? For | :16:29. | :16:33. | |
some it suggests that the inquiry was window dressing which allowed | :16:33. | :16:37. | |
Gardai to say they had investigated. But any suggestion of the State | :16:37. | :16:42. | |
avoiding the issue of a leak is hotly contestant. Do you think | :16:42. | :16:48. | |
there would be reluctance in the Irish State to fully investigate | :16:48. | :16:51. | |
the issue because of the potential political ramifications? No, none | :16:51. | :16:56. | |
what so ever. The sort of innuendo in that question is that such might | :16:56. | :17:01. | |
have existed. It did not exist. The government is bona fide and beyond | :17:01. | :17:07. | |
question. In January 1990 a special Gardai task force planned to raid | :17:07. | :17:12. | |
the home of IRA quartermaster, Michael McKevitt looking for a | :17:12. | :17:16. | |
false passport. The night before the raid, Dundalk guards were told | :17:16. | :17:23. | |
of the operation. An ex-guard, Dan Prenty, has told Smithwick that | :17:23. | :17:28. | |
shortly after a phone call was made to Warren McKevitt. So is this | :17:28. | :17:32. | |
definitive evidence that someone in the Dundalk guards was tipping off | :17:32. | :17:37. | |
the IRA less than a year after the Breen and Buchanan murders. | :17:38. | :17:41. | |
McKevitt has denied receiving such a call. Smithwick has heard his | :17:42. | :17:46. | |
phone was tapped, so the question is is, is there a tape of this | :17:46. | :17:51. | |
alleged tip-off and where is it? Smithwick also located Gardai | :17:51. | :17:54. | |
intelligence documents containing claims that the IRA had friends in | :17:54. | :17:58. | |
Dundalk's police force. Yet it seems there was still no action | :17:58. | :18:07. | |
taken. But this idea of a soft approach is strongly rejected by | :18:07. | :18:17. | |
:18:17. | :18:31. | ||
ex-Dundalk detective Dan Prenty. The film taps into the belief that | :18:31. | :18:35. | |
there were some rotten Apples in the guards. Is this there any truth | :18:35. | :18:41. | |
in it? Sean oh Callaghan is a former IRA commander and police | :18:41. | :18:46. | |
informer. He was invited to give evidence to Smithwick but declined. | :18:46. | :18:50. | |
He claims the guards were not as tough on on the IRA as they could | :18:50. | :18:56. | |
have been. I remember one occasion being arrested and this gardai | :18:56. | :19:01. | |
detective, who had just known he me for years, there was a young gardai | :19:01. | :19:05. | |
detective, literally new. He walks in and he says to this garda | :19:05. | :19:11. | |
detective. He says, "you sit there, Sean is going to sit there. You ask | :19:11. | :19:15. | |
some questions and Sean will educate you". He walked off | :19:15. | :19:22. | |
laughing. But any idea of a soft approach is strongly rejected by | :19:22. | :19:25. | |
ex-Dundalk detective Dan Prenty. Were you as a guard ever directed | :19:25. | :19:31. | |
to go easy on the IRA? Never. That was never policy at all. Never. The | :19:31. | :19:38. | |
guards at all times always at every chance confronted the IRA But Sean | :19:39. | :19:45. | |
oh Callaghan alleges son-in-law guards were sympathetic to the IRA. | :19:45. | :19:52. | |
He was aware of a senior IRA man, now a politician, who was handling | :19:52. | :19:57. | |
a gardai contact in the mid 0's. That contact was paid �5,000, which | :19:57. | :20:01. | |
I knew, for the IRA, was a huge amount of money for the IRA to pay | :20:01. | :20:06. | |
in those circumstances. I was the OC of the IRA Southern Command, but | :20:06. | :20:11. | |
I wasn't handling this. Or I wasn't allowed to hand this. This was | :20:11. | :20:21. | |
being handled a pay grade above me, if you like. But it wasn't just the | :20:21. | :20:25. | |
guards who were an issue for the British Government. General will si, | :20:25. | :20:29. | |
who had seven tours on duet tkwri in Northern Ireland said he was | :20:29. | :20:34. | |
frustrated that he never once was able to speak one-to-one with his | :20:34. | :20:38. | |
Irish army counterparts. We were not to have any dealings with the | :20:38. | :20:44. | |
British Army. Which, as far as Dublin was concerned, was an alien | :20:44. | :20:48. | |
army, an occupying army. Dublin didn't want to have any dealings | :20:48. | :20:53. | |
with us. What difference would co- operation with Irish arm have made? | :20:53. | :21:00. | |
It could have brought the troubles to a halt, I would have thought. | :21:00. | :21:05. | |
Kevin Myers was a Dublin journalist working in Belfast during the | :21:05. | :21:09. | |
Troubles who later wrote an article which made allegations of Gardai | :21:09. | :21:14. | |
collusion that played a part in the creation of the Smithwick Tribunal. | :21:14. | :21:18. | |
Fianna Fail government ministers actively encouraged the formation | :21:18. | :21:22. | |
of the Provisional IRA. Actively fed money, government money, to the | :21:22. | :21:26. | |
IRA. They helped to arm the IRA. They gave moral support to the IRA. | :21:26. | :21:30. | |
They were sympathetic to the cause of a united Ireland. That was | :21:30. | :21:33. | |
official Irish policy. Now the Irish State couldn't engage in a | :21:33. | :21:37. | |
war with Britain to do that. There were elements there who said, let | :21:37. | :21:43. | |
the IRA do the dirty work. former Fianna Fail Justice Minister | :21:43. | :21:49. | |
finds this view offensive. My party was totally, totally against the | :21:49. | :21:54. | |
use of violence in achieving their political aims. Totally 100%, 101%. | :21:54. | :21:57. | |
Brian Feeney argues the plot by some Irish government ministers to | :21:57. | :22:01. | |
arm the IRA in the 70s did not have the backing of the state. That was | :22:01. | :22:04. | |
not the Irish government. There were a couple of individuals. There | :22:04. | :22:09. | |
is no doubt there were individuals, particularly in Fianna Fail who did | :22:09. | :22:13. | |
want to send guns to the North. The Irish Government stamped on the | :22:13. | :22:19. | |
plot and threw out the people who were involved and put them on trial. | :22:19. | :22:25. | |
He also says that unionist claims the Irish State turned a blind eye | :22:25. | :22:30. | |
or allowed the IRA to do its dirty work are "laughable". This is a | :22:30. | :22:33. | |
familiar unionist myth that the Irish State was very worried about | :22:33. | :22:37. | |
the role of the IRA and the prospect at certain times of IRA | :22:37. | :22:41. | |
destabilising the Irish State. Historically, it was extradition | :22:41. | :22:45. | |
which was the major source of contention between the British and | :22:45. | :22:54. | |
Irish. A point which Jack Lynch felt the heat over after Narrow | :22:54. | :23:00. | |
Water. It was the the failure of the government to extradite known | :23:00. | :23:07. | |
IRA terrorist to the North. Any excuse was found not to do this. | :23:07. | :23:13. | |
Until the mid 80s Irish law meant IRA members could escape | :23:13. | :23:18. | |
extradition to the North to face terrorist charges by saying | :23:18. | :23:21. | |
political motivation. extradition laws were difficult. In | :23:21. | :23:26. | |
the 1980s, 30 years ago now, they wouldn't extradite people who had | :23:26. | :23:29. | |
escaped from jail in the North because people who had escaped from | :23:29. | :23:39. | |
:23:39. | :23:41. | ||
prison in the Big Escape were badly beaten by prison soldiers and | :23:41. | :23:48. | |
prison wardens. When they were brought back again so they weren't | :23:48. | :23:56. | |
extradited because of danger of injury. Evelyn Glenholmes ended not | :23:56. | :24:01. | |
in extradition but in farce. Figures reveal that 113 extradition | :24:01. | :24:05. | |
requests for terrorist related offences made to the republic | :24:05. | :24:11. | |
between 1973 and 1997, only eelgt were granted. Dan Prenty says it | :24:12. | :24:15. | |
was not the fault of the guards, but it was the fault of the courts | :24:16. | :24:25. | |
and the State. Every one that came to Dundalk were executed and the | :24:25. | :24:30. | |
person taken before the district court. I felt bad about the fact I | :24:30. | :24:36. | |
had executed the warrants, taken to court and no no progress to report. | :24:36. | :24:41. | |
Gerry Collins seems reluctant to get into this thorny issue? Were we | :24:41. | :24:45. | |
any different from any other country at the time? I know the | :24:45. | :24:54. | |
French you couldn't extradite a fly out of France.. Leave that question | :24:54. | :25:04. | |
:25:04. | :25:05. | ||
for someone else. OK? The Dublin Government is now await Smithwick's | :25:05. | :25:08. | |
findings. The hearings will run until at least Easter and a final | :25:08. | :25:15. | |
report is expected later this year. With the clock ticking, the Breen | :25:15. | :25:19. | |
family solicitor says the tribunal may set up a videolink in Northern | :25:19. | :25:22. | |
Ireland to encourage witnesses who have yet to come forward. Of those, | :25:22. | :25:27. | |
of whom I know, there would be four Ministry of Defence witnesses which | :25:27. | :25:30. | |
would include, for example, a soldier who was present on the | :25:30. | :25:35. | |
ground at the relevant periods of time. Getting to the truth though | :25:35. | :25:39. | |
is a long and difficult process. The Secretary of State is currently | :25:40. | :25:43. | |
holding talks with the Stormont political parties in an effort to | :25:43. | :25:46. | |
find a process to deal with the legacy of the Troubles. In recent | :25:46. | :25:50. | |
months, like the Irish government, he too has been made fully aware | :25:51. | :25:55. | |
that the past remains a toxic issue. I was so angry with the Prime | :25:55. | :26:00. | |
Minister that I actually -- called a halt to the meeting. Days after | :26:00. | :26:08. | |
David Cameron told the family of Pat Finucane they would not get a | :26:08. | :26:18. | |
:26:18. | :26:25. | ||
full public inquiry. Enda Kenny said he would raise their case in | :26:25. | :26:28. | |
London, Europe and Washington. response from the Irish government | :26:29. | :26:35. | |
has been non-co-operation in terms of meeting to discuss these issues. | :26:35. | :26:38. | |
Enda Kenny and his government can't have it both ways. He can't travel | :26:38. | :26:43. | |
around the world saying, I want to know the truth, I want a public | :26:43. | :26:47. | |
inquiry. In the Finucane case and at the same time deny hundreds of | :26:47. | :26:53. | |
people the right to question the Irish government on their role. | :26:53. | :26:58. | |
Danny Kennedy says he's tried for nearly nine months to get a full | :26:58. | :27:03. | |
meeting with the Taoiseach but only managed to get a chat at a North- | :27:03. | :27:08. | |
South Ministerial Council meeting in Armagh. I presented Enda Kenny | :27:08. | :27:15. | |
with a dossier detailing the murders of 159 members of the | :27:15. | :27:21. | |
forces or individuals at the hands of South Armagh republicans wo who | :27:21. | :27:25. | |
had operated from his jurisdiction. They have to stand up and say it | :27:25. | :27:30. | |
was wrong and they have to apologise. Spotlight has also the | :27:30. | :27:35. | |
Taoiseach and the Tanaiste and the Foreign Minister to talk about | :27:35. | :27:38. | |
these issues. No-one at Leinster House was available for interview. | :27:38. | :27:44. | |
It was the same response from the Gardai. For some, chasing down | :27:44. | :27:51. | |
either government is a game of sectarian what-about-ery. I think | :27:51. | :27:56. | |
in both cases you have a political agenda going on there. When | :27:56. | :27:58. | |
republicans seek apologies from the British government what they are | :27:58. | :28:04. | |
out to show is that it was all the British government fault. And on | :28:04. | :28:09. | |
the unionist side there is also a political agenda to try and | :28:09. | :28:13. | |
demonstrate that it wasn't an insurrection it was some outside | :28:13. | :28:18. | |
force that destabilised Northern Ireland which was a great wee place | :28:18. | :28:24. | |
before 69. For Jeffrey Donaldson and other unionists this is not | :28:24. | :28:29. | |
what-about-ery, but a demand for parity for unionist concerns and | :28:30. | :28:34. | |
he's adamant that they -- there can be no greed mechanism for dealing | :28:34. | :28:41. | |
with the past until this issue is addressed. They they want to be | :28:41. | :28:49. | |
included in the future they have to be accountable for the past. | :28:49. | :28:54. |