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Almost two years ago, Northern Ireland woke up | 0:00:06 | 0:00:10 | |
to the biggest property deal anyone here has ever seen. | 0:00:10 | 0:00:13 | |
Almost 900 properties. | 0:00:13 | 0:00:16 | |
Over ?1 billion. | 0:00:16 | 0:00:22 | |
This is not an ordinary transaction. | 0:00:22 | 0:00:28 | |
This is the largest transaction in the history of Northern Ireland. | 0:00:28 | 0:00:30 | |
The largest since the plantations. | 0:00:30 | 0:00:33 | |
And not a single For Sale sign anywhere. This deal saw the transfer | 0:00:33 | 0:00:36 | |
of a massive property loan portfolio from the Irish Government agency | 0:00:36 | 0:00:40 | |
Nama to an American vulture fund. | 0:00:40 | 0:00:43 | |
And the start of a financial scandal that goes to the heart of power | 0:00:43 | 0:00:48 | |
and influence in Northern Ireland. | 0:00:48 | 0:00:54 | |
Tonight on Spotlight we expose the extent of that scandal. | 0:00:54 | 0:01:00 | |
Because when three businessmen sat down last year to talk | 0:01:00 | 0:01:03 | |
about the payoff, Spotlight was there. | 0:01:03 | 0:01:08 | |
What was revealed was an attempt to illegally distribute millions | 0:01:08 | 0:01:15 | |
of pounds to this man: Former First Minister Peter Robinson's friend | 0:01:15 | 0:01:18 | |
and troubleshooter, Frank Cushnahan. When the money came | 0:01:18 | 0:01:25 | |
in he, he actually moved six million of it. | 0:01:25 | 0:01:28 | |
Cushnahan's done all this work, therefore, he's entitled to his fee. | 0:01:28 | 0:01:33 | |
A scandal that we can reveal has just been officially reported | 0:01:33 | 0:01:38 | |
by a whistle-blower to America's most powerful financial | 0:01:38 | 0:01:48 | |
investigations agency. | 0:01:49 | 0:01:57 | |
This is a story about debt: Not | 0:02:01 | 0:02:04 | |
the kind that comes with a mortgage or a credit card, but debt that can | 0:02:04 | 0:02:08 | |
only be acquired by the very rich. | 0:02:08 | 0:02:12 | |
The kind of debt that would make two governments sit up and take notice. | 0:02:12 | 0:02:22 | |
This is the story of a billion pound plan to cut that debt. | 0:02:23 | 0:02:26 | |
And it starts | 0:02:26 | 0:02:27 | |
with the men who made it happen. | 0:02:27 | 0:02:28 | |
These were people who would be regarded as pillars | 0:02:28 | 0:02:31 | |
of the establishment in many ways. | 0:02:31 | 0:02:35 | |
The fixers at the heart of a transaction that is now | 0:02:35 | 0:02:37 | |
the subject of criminal and parliamentary inquiries. | 0:02:37 | 0:02:43 | |
When these people spoke, they spoke with some authority, | 0:02:43 | 0:02:46 | |
knowledge and expertise. Ian Coulter is one of the people | 0:02:46 | 0:02:48 | |
the former First Minister was talking about. | 0:02:48 | 0:02:50 | |
He certainly spoke with authority. | 0:02:50 | 0:02:56 | |
If they set that as a target date let's meet it and give the business | 0:02:56 | 0:03:01 | |
the chance it needs to grow the economy by having a very | 0:03:01 | 0:03:06 | |
positive image internationally. | 0:03:06 | 0:03:08 | |
Ian Coulter has an impressive CV. | 0:03:08 | 0:03:18 | |
He was the managing partners in one of Northern Ireland's biggest law | 0:03:20 | 0:03:22 | |
firms, | 0:03:22 | 0:03:24 | |
he was also the first solicitor here to head the Confederation | 0:03:24 | 0:03:26 | |
of British Industry and he was even named Northern Ireland's deal maker | 0:03:26 | 0:03:29 | |
of the year. Coulter was at the very pinnacle | 0:03:29 | 0:03:31 | |
of his profession. | 0:03:31 | 0:03:32 | |
Then suddenly last year, he walked away from it all. | 0:03:32 | 0:03:35 | |
A few weeks later, he was under investigation by the Law Society - | 0:03:35 | 0:03:39 | |
an investigation started by his own firm, Tughans. | 0:03:39 | 0:03:42 | |
That inquiry has now been going on for over a year. | 0:03:42 | 0:03:45 | |
Spotlight has also been investigating what happened. | 0:03:45 | 0:03:50 | |
Almost ten months ago, we learned that Ian Coulter had | 0:03:50 | 0:03:54 | |
moved millions of pounds out of his law firm to a holding account | 0:03:54 | 0:03:57 | |
on the Isle of Man. We had learned that the money | 0:03:57 | 0:04:07 | |
was intended to be a payment, part of a fixer's fee for a deal | 0:04:07 | 0:04:11 | |
involving Ian Coulter. He was a lawyer for the buyer. | 0:04:11 | 0:04:13 | |
The sellers were Nama, an agency of the Irish Government. | 0:04:13 | 0:04:15 | |
Nama was created to save Irish banks after the crash. | 0:04:15 | 0:04:20 | |
Overnight it had become the biggest player in property | 0:04:20 | 0:04:24 | |
in Northern Ireland - controlling a portfolio once worth ?4.5 billion | 0:04:24 | 0:04:28 | |
The deal that Ian Coulter had helped to fix was the sale | 0:04:28 | 0:04:31 | |
of this vast portfolio. | 0:04:31 | 0:04:35 | |
But last summer, in the Dail, explosive allegations were made | 0:04:35 | 0:04:40 | |
about the fixer's fee controlled by Coulter. | 0:04:40 | 0:04:42 | |
Sorry settle down. | 0:04:42 | 0:04:44 | |
Deputy Wallace. | 0:04:44 | 0:04:49 | |
Independent TD Mick Wallace claimed in the Irish parliament that | 0:04:49 | 0:04:51 | |
Coulter's money was a kickback for a politician. | 0:04:51 | 0:04:54 | |
Do you have any concerns that a routine audit of a solicitor's | 0:04:54 | 0:05:00 | |
firm that looked after that particular deal where 4.5 billion | 0:05:00 | 0:05:04 | |
of assets were sold for 1.5, euros with a massive loss | 0:05:04 | 0:05:07 | |
for the Irish taxpayer? | 0:05:07 | 0:05:10 | |
A routine audit actually showed up where seven million sterling ended | 0:05:10 | 0:05:13 | |
up in an Isle of Man bank account. | 0:05:13 | 0:05:20 | |
It was reportedly earmarked for a Northern Ireland | 0:05:20 | 0:05:22 | |
politician or party. | 0:05:22 | 0:05:24 | |
Would Deputy Wallace give all those details to An Garda Siochana? | 0:05:24 | 0:05:31 | |
Do you not think it should be looked at? | 0:05:31 | 0:05:33 | |
No actual evidence of payment to a politician has emerged | 0:05:33 | 0:05:36 | |
And Mick Wallace's claim was denied by Ian Coulter, | 0:05:36 | 0:05:38 | |
the man who moved the money. | 0:05:38 | 0:05:43 | |
This is the Assembly Committee Room 30. | 0:05:43 | 0:05:48 | |
Parliamentary investigations started on both sides of the border. | 0:05:48 | 0:05:57 | |
And much of the focus has been on the two men Peter Robinson called | 0:05:57 | 0:06:00 | |
establishment figures: Ian Coulter and this man, Frank Cushnahan. | 0:06:00 | 0:06:10 | |
Look, I made it clear publicly that I have been friendly | 0:06:11 | 0:06:13 | |
with Frank for many years. | 0:06:13 | 0:06:18 | |
Frank Cushnahan was the other man Peter Robinson called a pillar | 0:06:18 | 0:06:22 | |
of the establishment. And here's the evidence the former | 0:06:22 | 0:06:24 | |
First Minister was right. | 0:06:24 | 0:06:29 | |
This is Cushnahan Quay. | 0:06:29 | 0:06:36 | |
A massive section of Belfast Harbour named after the man who once | 0:06:36 | 0:06:42 | |
presided over it. | 0:06:42 | 0:06:44 | |
Frank Cushnahan is an incredibly well connected | 0:06:44 | 0:06:48 | |
Belfast businessman. | 0:06:48 | 0:06:50 | |
He was chairman of the Belfast Harbour Commission for eight years. | 0:06:50 | 0:06:53 | |
His portrait hangs in their offices. | 0:06:53 | 0:07:00 | |
A former banker, he's been appointed to a range of Government advisory | 0:07:00 | 0:07:02 | |
posts by both direct rule and Executive ministers. | 0:07:02 | 0:07:05 | |
Do you view Frank Cushnahan as an honourable man? | 0:07:05 | 0:07:09 | |
I think that the general view of Frank Cushnahan, | 0:07:09 | 0:07:12 | |
in that he was used very considerably as an expert in these | 0:07:12 | 0:07:19 | |
areas, I was almost going to use the word guru in terms of banking | 0:07:19 | 0:07:22 | |
and financial issues. | 0:07:22 | 0:07:32 | |
When the First Minister called for help, Frank Cushnahan answered. | 0:07:32 | 0:07:35 | |
he was credited with staving off the collapse of the | 0:07:35 | 0:07:38 | |
Presbyterian Mutual Society. | 0:07:38 | 0:07:40 | |
And he found a mystery benefactor to rescue Glentoran football club. | 0:07:40 | 0:07:48 | |
But not everyone holds Frank Cushnahan in such high esteem. | 0:07:48 | 0:07:52 | |
His behaviour was criticised by a Stormont investigation | 0:07:52 | 0:07:54 | |
into the East Belfast company Red Sky. | 0:07:54 | 0:08:00 | |
On the management of Housing Executive maintenance | 0:08:00 | 0:08:03 | |
contracts, the Assembly's Public Accounts Committee said that | 0:08:03 | 0:08:06 | |
Mr Cushnahan's involvement in these negotiations was, | 0:08:06 | 0:08:07 | |
quote: Totally unethical and could and should | 0:08:07 | 0:08:11 | |
have been avoided. | 0:08:11 | 0:08:17 | |
Was the unethical aspect the fact that he had been a serving member | 0:08:17 | 0:08:20 | |
of the Housing Executive's audit committee? | 0:08:20 | 0:08:23 | |
I believe he did serve in that post, yes. | 0:08:23 | 0:08:28 | |
Nine years ago, Frank Cushnahan was an advisor to the Housing | 0:08:28 | 0:08:30 | |
Executive. | 0:08:30 | 0:08:34 | |
But he left that post to become chairman of Red Sky, | 0:08:34 | 0:08:37 | |
a company that worked for the Housing Executive. | 0:08:37 | 0:08:42 | |
He persuaded the Housing Executive to forgive most of Red Sky's debts. | 0:08:42 | 0:08:49 | |
Then negotiated down debts, allegedly, of the order of a quarter | 0:08:49 | 0:08:53 | |
of a million to ?20,000. | 0:08:53 | 0:08:55 | |
Is that accurate? | 0:08:55 | 0:08:56 | |
Yes, that is correct. | 0:08:56 | 0:08:58 | |
To the best of our knowledge, yes. | 0:08:58 | 0:09:03 | |
The Public Accounts Committee found that in 2007, Frank Cushnahan had | 0:09:03 | 0:09:08 | |
played on both sides of the fence to Red Sky's advantage. | 0:09:08 | 0:09:14 | |
Two years later, Frank was presented with an even bigger opportunity. | 0:09:14 | 0:09:18 | |
In 2009 the Dublin Government created the National Asset | 0:09:18 | 0:09:25 | |
Management Agency, Nama, to buy up the toxic debt | 0:09:25 | 0:09:28 | |
that | 0:09:28 | 0:09:29 | |
threatened to destabilise the entire economy. | 0:09:29 | 0:09:32 | |
And by doing so, created one of the world's biggest ever property | 0:09:32 | 0:09:42 | |
portfolios, worth nearly ?60 billion. | 0:09:42 | 0:09:46 | |
And what was significant for Northern Ireland was that | 0:09:46 | 0:09:51 | |
?4.5 billion of that debt was owed by developers based here. | 0:09:51 | 0:09:55 | |
Many politicians feared the Irish government would hold a fire sale - | 0:09:55 | 0:09:58 | |
quickly selling off swathes of property at once. | 0:09:58 | 0:10:03 | |
They feared that could drive property prices even lower, | 0:10:03 | 0:10:06 | |
as the then Finance Minister told Spotlight in 2011. | 0:10:06 | 0:10:15 | |
I think we are entering a much more dangerous phase, | 0:10:15 | 0:10:22 | |
because now Nama have to decide those businesses we have taken in, | 0:10:22 | 0:10:26 | |
first of all what are we going to do with the land and that's | 0:10:26 | 0:10:30 | |
where the fire sale danger could arise, where if they simply | 0:10:30 | 0:10:32 | |
try to off load all of that land on to the market, | 0:10:32 | 0:10:35 | |
it would make the situation far, far worse | 0:10:35 | 0:10:41 | |
So Nama agreed to set up a Northern Ireland advisory committee. | 0:10:41 | 0:10:43 | |
Handpicked by Sammy Wilson to sit on that committee, | 0:10:43 | 0:10:46 | |
was none other than Frank Cushnahan. | 0:10:46 | 0:10:51 | |
That gave Frank Cushnahan influence with both Nama | 0:10:51 | 0:10:53 | |
and Northern Ireland politicians. | 0:10:53 | 0:10:56 | |
So when it came to Northern Ireland's biggest ever property deal | 0:10:56 | 0:10:59 | |
Frank Cushnahan had the inside track. | 0:10:59 | 0:11:09 | |
It is amazing to think that right in the middle of Belfast this entire | 0:11:13 | 0:11:19 | |
block of shops, retail offices, this all went into Nama. | 0:11:19 | 0:11:21 | |
Yeah. | 0:11:21 | 0:11:23 | |
It was just really the scale of the acquisition. | 0:11:23 | 0:11:30 | |
It pretty much put Nama up there as one of the top property | 0:11:30 | 0:11:33 | |
companies in the world, really overnight. | 0:11:33 | 0:11:43 | |
That found its way into the Nama portfolio | 0:11:43 | 0:11:47 | |
as well. | 0:11:47 | 0:11:52 | |
The impact on Northern Ireland of the Nama acquisition | 0:11:52 | 0:11:56 | |
was so vast its effects could be seen everywhere. | 0:11:56 | 0:11:58 | |
And even this building, the Invest Northern Ireland | 0:11:58 | 0:12:00 | |
building. | 0:12:00 | 0:12:05 | |
Another iconic building that found its way into the Nama portfolio. | 0:12:05 | 0:12:09 | |
But Nama wasn't really about buying up property, | 0:12:09 | 0:12:11 | |
It was about buying up the bad debt, bad debt owed | 0:12:11 | 0:12:13 | |
by very few developers. | 0:12:13 | 0:12:20 | |
More than ?4 billion was owed by just 55 debtors. | 0:12:20 | 0:12:22 | |
And the vast bulk of that debt was with a handful of people. | 0:12:22 | 0:12:25 | |
Just as many people found their homes had gone into negative | 0:12:25 | 0:12:28 | |
equity, the properties owned by the developers were worth | 0:12:28 | 0:12:30 | |
a fraction of what they actually owed. | 0:12:30 | 0:12:35 | |
That put Nama in control of not just buildings and land, | 0:12:35 | 0:12:39 | |
but all the trappings of wealth and a million pound | 0:12:39 | 0:12:41 | |
collection of paintings. | 0:12:41 | 0:12:45 | |
And for many developers the risk extended to the very home | 0:12:45 | 0:12:47 | |
they lived in. | 0:12:47 | 0:12:50 | |
That's because they secured their loans with what's known | 0:12:50 | 0:12:52 | |
as personal guarantees. | 0:12:52 | 0:12:56 | |
A personal guarantee means that should the thing fail, | 0:12:56 | 0:13:01 | |
or should the bank or the lender need its money back it can seize | 0:13:01 | 0:13:05 | |
the home of the Director concerned. | 0:13:05 | 0:13:06 | |
So he's basically putting, he's putting his house on the line. | 0:13:06 | 0:13:15 | |
And Nama were very clear they were going after these guarantees. | 0:13:15 | 0:13:17 | |
I was asked the question specifically, | 0:13:17 | 0:13:19 | |
"Will we seek to enforce personal guarantees?" | 0:13:19 | 0:13:21 | |
The answer was, as a policy, "Yes. | 0:13:21 | 0:13:27 | |
Absolutely." | 0:13:27 | 0:13:30 | |
The developers were desperate to get out | 0:13:30 | 0:13:32 | |
from under the debt. | 0:13:32 | 0:13:35 | |
But Nama was prevented by law from negotiating any kind | 0:13:35 | 0:13:37 | |
of settlement with the developers. | 0:13:37 | 0:13:38 | |
That's because the Southern taxpayers who had bailed out | 0:13:38 | 0:13:40 | |
the developers in the first place would not stand for handing their | 0:13:40 | 0:13:43 | |
property back at what inevitably would be a discount, | 0:13:43 | 0:13:46 | |
as NAMA chairman Frank Daly told us in 2011. | 0:13:46 | 0:13:56 | |
Under the NAMA legislation, the NAMA act of 2009, | 0:13:56 | 0:13:59 | |
we are actually precluded from selling back an asset | 0:13:59 | 0:14:02 | |
to a defaulting debtor, so that is an immediate barrier. | 0:14:02 | 0:14:07 | |
You take an asset off somebody at a discounted value, | 0:14:07 | 0:14:12 | |
and then if the day afterwards you sell them back that at that | 0:14:12 | 0:14:15 | |
discounted value, the tax payers who have funded the gap | 0:14:15 | 0:14:17 | |
will understandably be very irate and very upset. | 0:14:17 | 0:14:26 | |
The developers were simply stuck. | 0:14:26 | 0:14:29 | |
For several years they were unable to buy back their properties. | 0:14:29 | 0:14:33 | |
But at least NAMA wasn't selling them to anyone else. | 0:14:33 | 0:14:36 | |
In April 2013, something happened that made it look | 0:14:36 | 0:14:39 | |
like that was all about to change. | 0:14:39 | 0:14:46 | |
The administrator appointed to operate a Portrush hotel says it | 0:14:46 | 0:14:48 | |
will be business as usual. | 0:14:48 | 0:14:49 | |
It's not clear what the long term future of the Ramada in the town | 0:14:49 | 0:14:53 | |
will be after the owners lost control to NAMA. | 0:14:53 | 0:14:56 | |
The owners of this hotel had tens of millions tied up | 0:15:08 | 0:15:12 | |
in loan guarantees. | 0:15:12 | 0:15:14 | |
In April 2013, Nama called in those loans. | 0:15:14 | 0:15:21 | |
The family say they had 24 hours to pay back ?48 million. | 0:15:21 | 0:15:24 | |
At that stage, this hotel was worth less than three. | 0:15:24 | 0:15:30 | |
The hotel was part of the Kennedy family group. | 0:15:30 | 0:15:35 | |
This is gladiatorial isn't it. | 0:15:35 | 0:15:37 | |
They're going to be swinging a ball and chain at each soon. | 0:15:37 | 0:15:40 | |
In 2009, the Kennedys were secure enough to sponsor | 0:15:40 | 0:15:42 | |
the North West 200. | 0:15:42 | 0:15:43 | |
The North West 200. | 0:15:43 | 0:15:45 | |
Look at that. | 0:15:45 | 0:15:46 | |
Just two years later, they were in debt to NAMA. | 0:15:46 | 0:15:48 | |
Over the line. | 0:15:48 | 0:15:55 | |
And in 2013, after failing to make repayments, NAMA called | 0:15:55 | 0:15:57 | |
in the administrators. | 0:15:57 | 0:16:00 | |
The DUP was particularly concerned. | 0:16:00 | 0:16:03 | |
NAMA's move against the hotel was raised by the local MP | 0:16:03 | 0:16:06 | |
Gregory Campbell and the MP for the neighbouring constituency, | 0:16:06 | 0:16:10 | |
Ian Paisley Junior. | 0:16:10 | 0:16:13 | |
Finance Minister Sammy Wilson phoned NAMA chairman Frank Daly | 0:16:13 | 0:16:16 | |
the next day. | 0:16:16 | 0:16:21 | |
It came as a shock to everybody that here was a hotel, a major hotel, | 0:16:21 | 0:16:24 | |
and suddenly at the beginning of the holiday period, | 0:16:24 | 0:16:26 | |
Nama decide to close it. | 0:16:26 | 0:16:30 | |
This was my worry: that we would going to start feeling the hard end | 0:16:30 | 0:16:33 | |
of NAMA's actions on some businesses in Northern Ireland and there were | 0:16:33 | 0:16:36 | |
going to be political consequences. | 0:16:36 | 0:16:45 | |
NAMA was under scrutiny but it was clearly ready to start | 0:16:47 | 0:16:50 | |
selling Northern Ireland property. | 0:16:50 | 0:16:52 | |
And that was making developers and politicians anxious. | 0:16:52 | 0:16:58 | |
A few weeks later, seemingly out of nowhere, | 0:16:58 | 0:17:01 | |
a saviour suddenly appeared. | 0:17:01 | 0:17:11 | |
Pimco. | 0:17:11 | 0:17:12 | |
A company with more than a trillion dollars at its disposal wanted | 0:17:12 | 0:17:15 | |
to buy NAMA out of Northern Ireland. | 0:17:15 | 0:17:17 | |
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic to investment | 0:17:17 | 0:17:19 | |
opportunities to managers like PIMCO. | 0:17:19 | 0:17:23 | |
This was a golden opportunity for developers to get | 0:17:23 | 0:17:25 | |
their properties back. | 0:17:25 | 0:17:28 | |
Pimco is the world's largest bond fund manager and they're a quite | 0:17:28 | 0:17:31 | |
well respected player in the asset management space. | 0:17:31 | 0:17:33 | |
And the idea that they should actually get into physically owning | 0:17:33 | 0:17:38 | |
huge tranches of real estate in Northern Ireland is actually | 0:17:38 | 0:17:40 | |
quite unusual it's not their core business. | 0:17:40 | 0:17:48 | |
From | 0:17:48 | 0:17:48 | |
From a | 0:17:48 | 0:17:49 | |
But rather than go to Dublin to meet NAMA who actually controlled | 0:17:53 | 0:17:56 | |
the property, PIMCO turned up at Stormont. | 0:17:56 | 0:17:59 | |
In May 2013, officials from the fund met Peter Robinson and Sammy Wilson | 0:17:59 | 0:18:05 | |
And the men who were also at that meeting were? | 0:18:07 | 0:18:10 | |
Ian Coulter and Frank Cushnahan. | 0:18:10 | 0:18:17 | |
50,000 surely to start me. | 0:18:17 | 0:18:20 | |
50 or 45. | 0:18:20 | 0:18:23 | |
So NAMA's Northern Ireland's portfolio was on the auction block - | 0:18:23 | 0:18:26 | |
but NAMA didn't even know it. | 0:18:26 | 0:18:32 | |
90,000, I like you, at 90,000, that's the way to do it. | 0:18:32 | 0:18:37 | |
Frank Cushnahan, NAMA's own adviser hadn't told them he was setting up | 0:18:37 | 0:18:44 | |
the biggest property deal in Northern Ireland's history. | 0:18:44 | 0:18:47 | |
It seems astonishing that one of their prized assets which is this | 0:18:49 | 0:18:52 | |
portfolio of properties, should be hawked around | 0:18:52 | 0:18:54 | |
without their knowledge, I mean I can't believe it. | 0:18:54 | 0:19:02 | |
It's odd, if they didn't know, yeah. | 0:19:02 | 0:19:03 | |
But it also tells you something about the thinking of those | 0:19:03 | 0:19:06 | |
who arranged these meetings, which was, the only way to get | 0:19:06 | 0:19:09 | |
things done it to get politicians on the job. | 0:19:09 | 0:19:11 | |
Frank Cushnahan says his NAMA work had nothing to do | 0:19:11 | 0:19:13 | |
with the PIMCO meeting. | 0:19:13 | 0:19:15 | |
But an expert on NAMA legislation, says he shouldn't have been involved | 0:19:15 | 0:19:19 | |
with PIMCO and NAMA. | 0:19:19 | 0:19:25 | |
The code of conduct that deals with the committees of NAMA | 0:19:25 | 0:19:27 | |
including the Advisory Committee requires that everyone act | 0:19:27 | 0:19:29 | |
in the best interest of NAMA and certainly if you're acting | 0:19:29 | 0:19:32 | |
on behalf of a third party, if you're acting for someone other | 0:19:32 | 0:19:35 | |
than NAMA that wouldn't be appropriate under | 0:19:35 | 0:19:37 | |
the code of practice. | 0:19:37 | 0:19:38 | |
But this wasn't Frank Cushnahan's first meeting without NAMA's | 0:19:38 | 0:19:40 | |
knowledge. | 0:19:40 | 0:19:44 | |
Spotlight can reveal that by the time PIMCO was introduced | 0:19:47 | 0:19:50 | |
to Peter Robinson, Cushnahan's involvement in the deal was already | 0:19:50 | 0:19:55 | |
much deeper than NAMA knew. | 0:19:55 | 0:20:00 | |
Weeks earlier, Frank Cushnahan and Ian Coulter had teamed up | 0:20:00 | 0:20:03 | |
with a major London law firm, Brown Rudnick. | 0:20:03 | 0:20:08 | |
Together they spoke to several big investment houses in London | 0:20:08 | 0:20:12 | |
at the end of April 2013. | 0:20:12 | 0:20:17 | |
Frank Cushnahan didn't tell NAMA. | 0:20:17 | 0:20:22 | |
If you're having meetings in secret with people in terms of dealings | 0:20:22 | 0:20:26 | |
with specifically a NAMA transaction, then that should | 0:20:26 | 0:20:28 | |
be disclosed to NAMA. | 0:20:28 | 0:20:31 | |
It would be a very serious breach of the NAMA Act not to disclose | 0:20:31 | 0:20:35 | |
that to NAMA. | 0:20:35 | 0:20:39 | |
Last month Frank Cushnahan's lawyer told NAMA about the London meetings | 0:20:39 | 0:20:44 | |
and said Cushnahan had been talking to investors about generic | 0:20:44 | 0:20:46 | |
opportunities for investment. | 0:20:46 | 0:20:51 | |
But PIMCO says the meeting its representatives took part | 0:20:51 | 0:20:55 | |
in was about identifying "potential purchasers for the NAMA | 0:20:55 | 0:20:58 | |
Northern Irish portfolio." And PIMCO says this was when they were offered | 0:20:58 | 0:21:04 | |
the extraordinary access that led to the meeting with Peter Robinson. | 0:21:04 | 0:21:09 | |
Ian Coulter and Frank Cushnahan claimed to know what the Northern | 0:21:09 | 0:21:13 | |
Ireland executive thinks, and what the Northern Ireland | 0:21:13 | 0:21:19 | |
Executive will do, what does that tell you? | 0:21:19 | 0:21:24 | |
Well, I suppose it shows they've had you know previous discussion | 0:21:24 | 0:21:27 | |
with senior members of the Northern Ireland government | 0:21:27 | 0:21:35 | |
or else they're just half hitting and actually they're just making it | 0:21:35 | 0:21:37 | |
up, but I suspect it's the former. | 0:21:37 | 0:21:40 | |
Frank Cushnahan says he did not arrange the PIMCO | 0:21:40 | 0:21:42 | |
meeting at Stormont. | 0:21:42 | 0:21:46 | |
But Peter Robinson told us it WAS initiated by Frank Cushnahan | 0:21:46 | 0:21:48 | |
and Ian Coulter. | 0:21:48 | 0:21:53 | |
We might have expressed an interest or a willingness to have such | 0:21:53 | 0:21:55 | |
a meeting, but we never requested it. | 0:21:55 | 0:22:00 | |
The Sinn Fein Assembly member leading Stormont's inquiry | 0:22:00 | 0:22:06 | |
into the sale says the Ministers should have known better. | 0:22:06 | 0:22:08 | |
I think any Minister should have had alarm bells going off in their head, | 0:22:08 | 0:22:16 | |
when they saw Mr Cushnahan involved in the potential sale | 0:22:16 | 0:22:19 | |
of the portfolio, whilst at the same time sitting on the Nama Committee. | 0:22:19 | 0:22:24 | |
Sammy Wilson wasn't alarmed. | 0:22:24 | 0:22:28 | |
He wrote to Irish Finance Minister Michael Noonan with PIMCO's proposal | 0:22:28 | 0:22:30 | |
- the fund wanted a private, closed-market sale. | 0:22:30 | 0:22:38 | |
But that presented a problem, because NAMA is supposed to get | 0:22:38 | 0:22:44 | |
the best return for the Irish taxpayers, it's meant | 0:22:44 | 0:22:49 | |
to sell its assets competitively on the open market. | 0:22:49 | 0:22:52 | |
It's extraordinary that you have two senior ministers, | 0:22:52 | 0:22:54 | |
in two different administrations, in contact, about how a major sale | 0:22:54 | 0:22:59 | |
should, should operate, and it seems to me that there | 0:22:59 | 0:23:02 | |
are political pressures, and unhealthy political pressures, | 0:23:02 | 0:23:04 | |
building up here. | 0:23:04 | 0:23:10 | |
Sammy Wilson later downplayed the significance of this letter. | 0:23:10 | 0:23:14 | |
Here is the important thing. | 0:23:14 | 0:23:15 | |
At that time, | 0:23:15 | 0:23:17 | |
it was not an important issue. | 0:23:17 | 0:23:21 | |
This was kind of a flyer almost to see whether Nama | 0:23:21 | 0:23:27 | |
and the Irish Government were interested in a deal of this | 0:23:27 | 0:23:29 | |
sort. | 0:23:29 | 0:23:35 | |
The Irish Finance Minister sent the proposal on to Nama. | 0:23:35 | 0:23:40 | |
Nama had never considered a sale this big before. | 0:23:40 | 0:23:44 | |
But the agency was obviously interested. | 0:23:44 | 0:23:50 | |
By September 2013, | 0:23:50 | 0:23:51 | |
Nama had started talking directly to Pimco. | 0:23:51 | 0:23:57 | |
That same month, Peter Robinson made a crucial intervention. | 0:23:57 | 0:23:59 | |
In a speech to DUP supporters, the First Minister attacked Nama | 0:23:59 | 0:24:03 | |
and for the first time, he publicly advocated selling Nama's | 0:24:03 | 0:24:09 | |
entire Northern Ireland portfolio in one go. | 0:24:09 | 0:24:14 | |
Both Nama and the Irish Government were surprised by the First | 0:24:14 | 0:24:19 | |
Minister's speech. | 0:24:19 | 0:24:20 | |
NAMA chairman Frank Daly said it was at odds | 0:24:20 | 0:24:23 | |
with everything that had previously come out | 0:24:23 | 0:24:25 | |
of the Northern Irish political system. | 0:24:25 | 0:24:28 | |
And the Irish Department of Finance said Peter Robinson's speech | 0:24:28 | 0:24:31 | |
was a total change of position. | 0:24:31 | 0:24:35 | |
But Peter Robinson denied a U-turn. | 0:24:36 | 0:24:40 | |
We needed something to stimulate the local market, that's why I think | 0:24:40 | 0:24:44 | |
we moved from the position in 2009, fear of a fire sale to some | 0:24:44 | 0:24:49 | |
responsible orderly disposal, being the way forward. | 0:24:49 | 0:24:53 | |
But, significantly, Richard Bullick, the special adviser | 0:24:53 | 0:25:00 | |
to Peter Robinson who dealt with the sale, indicated | 0:25:00 | 0:25:02 | |
that the First Minister's thinking was now perfectly aligned | 0:25:02 | 0:25:05 | |
with the views of Coulter and Cushnahan. | 0:25:05 | 0:25:08 | |
Are you saying that Ian and Frank had an influence | 0:25:08 | 0:25:10 | |
on the change of position? | 0:25:10 | 0:25:13 | |
What I am saying is, I am saying that my understanding, | 0:25:13 | 0:25:15 | |
again, I wouldn't be an expert by any means on the property | 0:25:15 | 0:25:19 | |
industry or anything else, but, certainly the view that Sammy | 0:25:19 | 0:25:23 | |
and Peter would have taken was the same as the view taken | 0:25:23 | 0:25:27 | |
by Ian and Frank. | 0:25:27 | 0:25:31 | |
After Peter Robinson's public intervention came a moment | 0:25:31 | 0:25:34 | |
of pantomime. | 0:25:34 | 0:25:36 | |
NAMA thought it was a good idea to tell their Northern Ireland | 0:25:36 | 0:25:41 | |
advisors about Pimco. | 0:25:41 | 0:25:42 | |
So at a meeting in Tughans law firm in Belfast, where Frank Cushnahan | 0:25:42 | 0:25:46 | |
had an office, Nama chairman Frank Daly made what he thought | 0:25:46 | 0:25:51 | |
was a big announcement - Pimco wanted to buy Nama's Northern Irish | 0:25:51 | 0:25:54 | |
portfolio | 0:25:54 | 0:25:55 | |
for over ?1 billion. | 0:25:55 | 0:25:57 | |
So Ian Coulter and Frank Cushnahan brought Pimco's sale proposal | 0:25:57 | 0:26:02 | |
to Peter Robinson and Sammy Wilson. | 0:26:02 | 0:26:07 | |
They told Irish Finance Minister Michael Noonan, | 0:26:07 | 0:26:11 | |
and then he told NAMA chairman Frank Daly. | 0:26:11 | 0:26:16 | |
Now here was Frank Daly telling Frank Cushnahan - the man who'd | 0:26:16 | 0:26:20 | |
started it all in the first place. | 0:26:20 | 0:26:26 | |
Frank Daly told Cushnahan and the rest of the Committee | 0:26:26 | 0:26:28 | |
that the proposed deal was extremely politically sensitive and absolute | 0:26:28 | 0:26:30 | |
confidentiality was required. | 0:26:30 | 0:26:37 | |
It had been five months since Frank Cushnahan | 0:26:37 | 0:26:41 | |
first met PIMCO. | 0:26:41 | 0:26:42 | |
And he hadn't said a word. | 0:26:42 | 0:26:45 | |
We've spoken to someone else who was at that meeting. | 0:26:45 | 0:26:48 | |
Brian Rowntree was the other Northern Ireland advisor to Nama | 0:26:48 | 0:26:52 | |
and he says Frank Cushnahan did not disclose that he was | 0:26:52 | 0:26:55 | |
involved with Pimco. | 0:26:55 | 0:26:58 | |
Would you be surprised if one of the committee members at that | 0:26:58 | 0:27:01 | |
meeting worked for Pimco on their bid for the Northern | 0:27:01 | 0:27:04 | |
Ireland Nama portfolio? | 0:27:04 | 0:27:09 | |
I would be shocked if that is the case, because no declaration | 0:27:09 | 0:27:12 | |
was ever confirmed to the meeting. | 0:27:12 | 0:27:15 | |
I would be surprised, absolutely surprised, | 0:27:15 | 0:27:17 | |
that a person associated to the committee would be involved | 0:27:17 | 0:27:19 | |
in a live bid process. | 0:27:19 | 0:27:26 | |
Would you have been comfortable in that scenario? | 0:27:26 | 0:27:28 | |
Personally, no. | 0:27:28 | 0:27:30 | |
I... | 0:27:30 | 0:27:31 | |
I believe that I would have been compromised in that situation. | 0:27:31 | 0:27:34 | |
Why? | 0:27:34 | 0:27:35 | |
Well, I believe I would have been seen as perceived first | 0:27:35 | 0:27:38 | |
of all as having access to information to add benefit | 0:27:38 | 0:27:41 | |
to that bid you really can't advise Nama and advise the | 0:27:41 | 0:27:44 | |
third party as well. | 0:27:44 | 0:27:49 | |
If | 0:27:49 | 0:27:49 | |
If a | 0:27:49 | 0:27:50 | |
Frank Daly arrives and announces that Pimco are If a interested | 0:27:50 | 0:27:52 | |
in buying | 0:27:52 | 0:27:54 | |
the portfolio, Frank Cushnahan says nothing. | 0:27:54 | 0:27:58 | |
In that circumstance he would be absolutely obliged to step out | 0:27:58 | 0:28:00 | |
of the room so that he's not present for the discussion, | 0:28:00 | 0:28:03 | |
not seek to influence the discussion in any way, | 0:28:03 | 0:28:06 | |
but prior to doing so disclose his interest. | 0:28:06 | 0:28:09 | |
Frank Cushnahan recently told Nama he never had any conflict | 0:28:09 | 0:28:11 | |
of interest at any time during his service on the advisory committee. | 0:28:11 | 0:28:17 | |
The meeting was Frank Cushnahan's last as a Nama advisor. | 0:28:17 | 0:28:20 | |
He resigned soon after, referring to "family priorities." | 0:28:20 | 0:28:29 | |
Cushnahan was out of Nama, but by that stage the company | 0:28:29 | 0:28:33 | |
he and Coulter brought forward was well founded | 0:28:33 | 0:28:35 | |
with the politicians. | 0:28:35 | 0:28:36 | |
The day after he made his speech attacking Nama, Peter Robinson asked | 0:28:36 | 0:28:43 | |
to meet the Irish Finance Minister Michael Noonan. | 0:28:43 | 0:28:47 | |
The meeting took place the same day that Michael Noonan came to Belfast | 0:28:47 | 0:28:51 | |
to have lunch with Ian Coulter and the CBI. | 0:28:51 | 0:28:54 | |
When I was in Stormont Castle this morning with Peter, | 0:28:54 | 0:28:58 | |
well, we had conversations to agree a way forward. | 0:28:58 | 0:29:01 | |
But that's all they were, conversations. | 0:29:01 | 0:29:04 | |
Was Pimco discussed at that meeting? | 0:29:04 | 0:29:10 | |
I do not know whether Pimco was discussed as such, | 0:29:10 | 0:29:13 | |
the discussion may well have dealt with the issue of whether | 0:29:13 | 0:29:18 | |
it was possible to do, for Nama to come to terms | 0:29:18 | 0:29:20 | |
with a single bidder. | 0:29:20 | 0:29:26 | |
Pimco's bid was discussed. | 0:29:26 | 0:29:32 | |
This is the Executive's note of that meeting. | 0:29:32 | 0:29:36 | |
It shows Peter Robinson backing Pimco's bid for a secret sale. | 0:29:36 | 0:29:41 | |
The First Minister said Nama's policy of selling on the open market | 0:29:41 | 0:29:43 | |
could devastate the Northern Ireland economy. | 0:29:43 | 0:29:50 | |
He highlighted how it would be possible with one potential bidder, | 0:29:50 | 0:29:52 | |
Pimco, to negotiate terms and conditions. | 0:29:52 | 0:29:58 | |
This was a big request. | 0:29:58 | 0:30:01 | |
The Irish government was committed to competitive sales on the open | 0:30:01 | 0:30:03 | |
market because they believed that was the way to get the best | 0:30:03 | 0:30:06 | |
price, the most money to pay back to the taxpayer. | 0:30:06 | 0:30:12 | |
But here was Peter Robinson asking Dublin to consider a private sale | 0:30:12 | 0:30:16 | |
to the firm that had approached DUP ministers. | 0:30:16 | 0:30:25 | |
So, why was Peter Robinson so keen on Pimco's bid? | 0:30:25 | 0:30:29 | |
Unknown to Dublin - or at that stage, to any other party | 0:30:29 | 0:30:33 | |
in the Executive - the company had drafted an agreement | 0:30:33 | 0:30:36 | |
with DUP ministers known as a memorandum of understanding, | 0:30:36 | 0:30:39 | |
or MOU. | 0:30:39 | 0:30:49 | |
In it, Pimco promised to use Northern Ireland suppliers | 0:30:51 | 0:30:53 | |
and create some jobs | 0:30:53 | 0:30:54 | |
in a local office. | 0:30:54 | 0:30:55 | |
I do not think that anybody could say that an MOU would be | 0:30:55 | 0:30:58 | |
a bad thing. | 0:30:58 | 0:30:59 | |
If somebody is coming in with over ?1 billion worth of assets | 0:30:59 | 0:31:06 | |
to dispose of, it is in the interest of the local community to ensure | 0:31:06 | 0:31:09 | |
that those assets are disposed of in an orderly way. | 0:31:09 | 0:31:12 | |
But that Memorandum of Understanding carried one | 0:31:12 | 0:31:16 | |
other important stipulation. | 0:31:16 | 0:31:20 | |
Pimco offered to forgive the personal guarantees that hung | 0:31:20 | 0:31:24 | |
over developers - the threat that could take their very homes. | 0:31:24 | 0:31:27 | |
So, where did the MOU come from? | 0:31:27 | 0:31:34 | |
From the man who had been involved in the deal from the very start. | 0:31:34 | 0:31:42 | |
One day last year, Frank Cushnahan walked out of his office in Tughans | 0:31:42 | 0:31:47 | |
and into this hotel to have lunch with two men. | 0:31:47 | 0:31:50 | |
Spotlight was also there. | 0:31:50 | 0:31:59 | |
Cushnahan is on the far right. | 0:32:00 | 0:32:06 | |
Next to him is John Miskelly, a Nama developer and the man seen | 0:32:06 | 0:32:10 | |
here wearing a pink top. | 0:32:10 | 0:32:13 | |
And on the left, wearing the suit, is David Grey, an accountant. | 0:32:13 | 0:32:18 | |
Over the next two hours, out of his own mouth, | 0:32:18 | 0:32:22 | |
Frank Cushnahan revealed how deeply he was involved in the sale | 0:32:22 | 0:32:24 | |
of Nama's Northern Ireland portfolio . | 0:32:24 | 0:32:32 | |
We recorded them during lunch in a noisy hotel lobby. | 0:32:32 | 0:32:34 | |
Since then we've carefully analysed the recording of that meeting, | 0:32:34 | 0:32:38 | |
using BBC sound engineers and an independent digital forensic | 0:32:38 | 0:32:42 | |
expert to check exactly what was said. | 0:32:42 | 0:32:48 | |
That's the key phrase there. | 0:32:48 | 0:32:58 | |
We've also obtained another recording of the conversation | 0:32:59 | 0:33:01 | |
from a third party. | 0:33:01 | 0:33:06 | |
It clearly establishes that Frank Cushnahan and Ian Coulter | 0:33:06 | 0:33:10 | |
appear to have played a central role in securing the Memorandum | 0:33:10 | 0:33:14 | |
of Understanding between Pimco and Peter Robinson. | 0:33:14 | 0:33:24 | |
So, here Cushnahan claims credit for the MOU, the Memorandum | 0:33:39 | 0:33:42 | |
of Understanding that would forgive personal guarantees. | 0:33:42 | 0:33:52 | |
We've been told by a reputable source that amounted | 0:33:53 | 0:33:57 | |
to ?200 million, which would be potentially wiped off | 0:33:57 | 0:34:00 | |
the Northern Ireland debt from the first day | 0:34:00 | 0:34:02 | |
of Pimco's purchase. | 0:34:02 | 0:34:06 | |
Though you would not think it, given some of the comments | 0:34:06 | 0:34:10 | |
that have been made, the MOU was to cover every debtor | 0:34:10 | 0:34:12 | |
and not a so-called privileged few. | 0:34:12 | 0:34:15 | |
When Peter Robinson talked about clearing every debtor, | 0:34:15 | 0:34:18 | |
he wasn't talking about the many people who lost their | 0:34:18 | 0:34:20 | |
homes in the crash. | 0:34:20 | 0:34:24 | |
He was talking about 55 debtors who had been the amongst the richest | 0:34:24 | 0:34:27 | |
developers in Northern Ireland. | 0:34:27 | 0:34:34 | |
I mean, certainly from the perspective of the underlying | 0:34:34 | 0:34:37 | |
borrowers it's great news, but as far as Pimco and its, | 0:34:37 | 0:34:42 | |
its own investors are concerned, it's not a good deal at all. | 0:34:42 | 0:34:49 | |
I've never come across that and I think I would frankly be quite | 0:34:49 | 0:34:52 | |
surprised if, if a company of Pimco's credibility and success, | 0:34:52 | 0:34:56 | |
would have entered into such an agreement. | 0:34:56 | 0:34:58 | |
We asked Pimco why they would be willing to forgive a substantial | 0:34:58 | 0:35:01 | |
portion of the Northern Ireland debt. | 0:35:01 | 0:35:03 | |
They did not respond. | 0:35:03 | 0:35:11 | |
Even though one of Nama's advisors had delivered the memorandum | 0:35:11 | 0:35:17 | |
of understanding, Nama was astonished when they saw it - | 0:35:17 | 0:35:19 | |
especially because the very first item was the forgiveness | 0:35:19 | 0:35:22 | |
of personal guarantees. | 0:35:22 | 0:35:28 | |
When we looked at the MOU, or whatever it was, we would never | 0:35:28 | 0:35:35 | |
ever have countenanced this as a condition of sale. | 0:35:35 | 0:35:40 | |
It would be a debtors' charter. | 0:35:40 | 0:35:43 | |
Number one would be a debtors' charter. | 0:35:43 | 0:35:47 | |
Pimco's purchase might have been good for Northern Ireland. | 0:35:47 | 0:35:52 | |
But the Memorandum of Understanding meant it would have been a great | 0:35:52 | 0:35:55 | |
deal for developers - it would erase their personal | 0:35:55 | 0:35:59 | |
guarantees and give them the opportunity to regain control | 0:35:59 | 0:36:02 | |
of their properties with some of the original debt erased. | 0:36:02 | 0:36:11 | |
So, it should come as no surprise that Frank Cushnahan wasn't | 0:36:12 | 0:36:15 | |
just working for Nama and Pimco, he was also working | 0:36:15 | 0:36:17 | |
for the developers who would get rescued by the deal. | 0:36:17 | 0:36:26 | |
Both Peter Robinson and his special adviser told | 0:36:26 | 0:36:30 | |
Stormont's Finance Committee that they thought Frank Cushnahan | 0:36:30 | 0:36:35 | |
had become involved in the deal because he had clients caught | 0:36:35 | 0:36:38 | |
up in Nama. | 0:36:38 | 0:36:40 | |
Who were Frank's clients? | 0:36:40 | 0:36:43 | |
I am not aware of specific names, but Frank is a well-known person | 0:36:43 | 0:36:46 | |
in that world. | 0:36:46 | 0:36:47 | |
Clients in what respect? | 0:36:47 | 0:36:54 | |
I understand that he works with people who are in the - maybe | 0:36:54 | 0:36:57 | |
it is not an industry - development community. | 0:36:57 | 0:37:04 | |
He had clients who were caught up in the Nama... | 0:37:04 | 0:37:07 | |
I assume that that was the case. | 0:37:07 | 0:37:11 | |
So, Frank Cushnahan wasn't just playing for two sides of this deal, | 0:37:11 | 0:37:17 | |
he was playing three - the potential buyer, | 0:37:17 | 0:37:20 | |
the seller and the developers who would benefit from the sale. | 0:37:20 | 0:37:29 | |
He was a member of the Northern Ireland Advisory | 0:37:30 | 0:37:32 | |
Board for Nama. | 0:37:32 | 0:37:41 | |
He was meeting potential buyers, for the project. | 0:37:41 | 0:37:47 | |
He was also acted on behalf of clients who had loans transferred | 0:37:47 | 0:37:50 | |
into Nama, Mr Cushnahan seems to have an extraordinary level | 0:37:50 | 0:37:52 | |
of conflicts of interest, for one individual. | 0:37:52 | 0:37:54 | |
We've been told by several sources that Frank Cushnahan held | 0:37:54 | 0:37:56 | |
what were known as "clinics" for developers caught up in Nama. | 0:37:56 | 0:37:59 | |
Clinics in which he would tell developers how to survive | 0:37:59 | 0:38:01 | |
the agency. | 0:38:01 | 0:38:02 | |
One participant told us the meeting was in Tughans and the coffee | 0:38:02 | 0:38:05 | |
was served by Tughans. | 0:38:05 | 0:38:15 | |
Pimco offered Nama over a billion pounds for the Northern Ireland | 0:38:19 | 0:38:21 | |
portfolio | 0:38:21 | 0:38:22 | |
in December 2013. | 0:38:22 | 0:38:23 | |
Then Nama decided to open up the sales process beyond Pimco | 0:38:23 | 0:38:26 | |
But Pimco still looked like the favourite. | 0:38:26 | 0:38:28 | |
However American companies have strict legal requirements | 0:38:28 | 0:38:31 | |
about reporting who they pay in any transaction like this. | 0:38:31 | 0:38:36 | |
As American funds, they are caught under the Foreign Corrupt Practices | 0:38:36 | 0:38:39 | |
Act. | 0:38:39 | 0:38:41 | |
They have to do certain internal checks and sign off on that. | 0:38:41 | 0:38:45 | |
They obviously twigged that Mr Cushnahan was part | 0:38:45 | 0:38:47 | |
of the process. | 0:38:47 | 0:38:50 | |
Three weeks before the sale was due to close, Pimco phoned Nama | 0:38:50 | 0:38:54 | |
with news about Frank Cushnahan. | 0:38:54 | 0:38:58 | |
Pimco was going to pay him. | 0:38:58 | 0:39:02 | |
The next thing I heard was Pimco tell us he was to get a fee. | 0:39:02 | 0:39:06 | |
On what date did that occur and how long was it after his resignation? | 0:39:06 | 0:39:09 | |
On 10 March. | 0:39:09 | 0:39:11 | |
For how long had he been working for Pimco? | 0:39:11 | 0:39:14 | |
What was his acquisition fee? | 0:39:14 | 0:39:16 | |
We do not know that either. | 0:39:16 | 0:39:21 | |
A subsequent piece of information which came to us that indicated | 0:39:21 | 0:39:26 | |
that there was a fee of ?15 million which was to be split three ways | 0:39:26 | 0:39:31 | |
between Brown Rudnick, Tughans, the managing partner of Tughans | 0:39:31 | 0:39:34 | |
and Mr Frank Cushnahan. | 0:39:34 | 0:39:36 | |
Wow. | 0:39:36 | 0:39:44 | |
I remember when I heard about it, in the, in the PAC, | 0:39:44 | 0:39:47 | |
when Frank Daly said, "yeah, there was ?5 million | 0:39:47 | 0:39:49 | |
going to him, and ?15 million" The figures are just amazing, er, | 0:39:49 | 0:39:52 | |
what did he do, to get ?5 million? | 0:39:52 | 0:39:59 | |
Nama thought it would be unacceptable for their former | 0:39:59 | 0:40:03 | |
advisor to be paid by the company buying the Northern | 0:40:03 | 0:40:05 | |
Ireland portfolio. | 0:40:05 | 0:40:14 | |
The Nama board held an emergency meeting about Pimco's proposed | 0:40:14 | 0:40:16 | |
payment to Frank Cushnahan. | 0:40:16 | 0:40:20 | |
Pimco was out of the deal by the end of the day - but the Board decided | 0:40:20 | 0:40:24 | |
the sale would continue. | 0:40:24 | 0:40:28 | |
Politicians have said this was the crucial moment in the sales | 0:40:28 | 0:40:32 | |
process - instead of halting the sale and getting to the bottom | 0:40:32 | 0:40:35 | |
of Frank Cushnahan's role, Nama decided to sell | 0:40:35 | 0:40:37 | |
to someone else. | 0:40:37 | 0:40:47 | |
Well, I think it's negligent on the part of Nama, I mean, | 0:40:47 | 0:40:51 | |
Nama really ought to have you know at least halted the proceedings, | 0:40:51 | 0:40:55 | |
while they, they investigated the nature of the sweetener | 0:40:55 | 0:41:00 | |
that was supposed to be paid to Frank Cushnahan. | 0:41:00 | 0:41:04 | |
Erm, rather than just kind of racing in to the next prospective buyer | 0:41:04 | 0:41:12 | |
of the portfolio. | 0:41:12 | 0:41:14 | |
This is Nama's record of that meeting - the meeting | 0:41:14 | 0:41:17 | |
in which they learned about the proposed payment | 0:41:17 | 0:41:18 | |
to Frank Cushnahan and decided to proceed with the sale anyway. | 0:41:18 | 0:41:24 | |
It has been entirely redacted. | 0:41:24 | 0:41:31 | |
So, these are the minutes of the Nama board where | 0:41:31 | 0:41:33 | |
they actually discussed Pimco's concerns around er, Frank Cushnahan | 0:41:33 | 0:41:35 | |
and the potential payment of ?5 million to him. | 0:41:35 | 0:41:40 | |
It's completely redacted. | 0:41:40 | 0:41:44 | |
I presume because of commercial sensitivity. | 0:41:44 | 0:41:46 | |
So we have to take the word of Nama. | 0:41:46 | 0:41:51 | |
And for a deal that was, the biggest transaction | 0:41:51 | 0:41:54 | |
in the history of Nama, in the history of Northern Ireland | 0:41:54 | 0:42:00 | |
and that this is the only assurance that we're given, | 0:42:00 | 0:42:07 | |
a page of redacted information, then, you know, it does raise big | 0:42:07 | 0:42:10 | |
questions over the integrity of the entire deal. | 0:42:10 | 0:42:12 | |
Nama admits the proposed payment to Frank Cushnahan might look bad, | 0:42:12 | 0:42:15 | |
but the agency and Frank Cushnahan both say the sales process was not | 0:42:15 | 0:42:20 | |
tainted because Cushnahan did not have access | 0:42:20 | 0:42:23 | |
to sensitive information. | 0:42:23 | 0:42:28 | |
It is mind boggling that they would go and ask a guy to act for them | 0:42:28 | 0:42:34 | |
and pay him an acquisition fee of ?5 million if he was just | 0:42:34 | 0:42:37 | |
an ordinary Joe Soap off the street who did not know anything | 0:42:37 | 0:42:39 | |
about the property portfolio. | 0:42:39 | 0:42:42 | |
He had an office. | 0:42:42 | 0:42:49 | |
I do not disagree with the theory but all I can say is | 0:42:49 | 0:42:52 | |
that | 0:42:52 | 0:42:53 | |
from his work with Nama on the Northern Ireland advisory | 0:42:53 | 0:42:56 | |
committee, he did not gain any inside knowledge of the portfolio | 0:42:56 | 0:42:58 | |
That's the most unbelievable part of the Nama narrative. | 0:42:58 | 0:43:01 | |
The idea that you have a board, giving you advice on property, | 0:43:01 | 0:43:04 | |
who isn't told anything about the portfolio, | 0:43:04 | 0:43:05 | |
doesn't wash, absolutely doesn't wash at all. | 0:43:05 | 0:43:08 | |
Are you surprised that Nama actually has put it out there? | 0:43:08 | 0:43:11 | |
Well, it's the only possible defence they can put up. | 0:43:11 | 0:43:16 | |
Brian Rowntree also sat on the Committee and he says | 0:43:16 | 0:43:19 | |
they did see sensitive information. | 0:43:19 | 0:43:23 | |
But it would be fair to say that the information that | 0:43:23 | 0:43:31 | |
I witnessed and I heard in Nama offered commercial opportunity. | 0:43:31 | 0:43:33 | |
How valuable would that information have been to a bidder | 0:43:33 | 0:43:36 | |
for the Northern Ireland Nama portfolio? | 0:43:36 | 0:43:41 | |
What I would say was that information that we discussed | 0:43:41 | 0:43:44 | |
of a commercially sensitive nature in my view, would have added some | 0:43:44 | 0:43:47 | |
value to their application. | 0:43:47 | 0:43:55 | |
Because it would have given them some steer on the strategic | 0:43:55 | 0:44:01 | |
capacity to work out that overall portfolio. | 0:44:01 | 0:44:03 | |
With Pimco out, another American financial giant, | 0:44:03 | 0:44:04 | |
Cerberus, turned up at Stormont. | 0:44:04 | 0:44:13 | |
Their chairman, former US vice president Dan Quayle, | 0:44:13 | 0:44:15 | |
visited Peter Robinson. | 0:44:15 | 0:44:20 | |
I am less surprised that Cerberus was able to have the meeting | 0:44:20 | 0:44:23 | |
with Peter Robinson as quickly as, as that because they, | 0:44:23 | 0:44:25 | |
their whole kind of stock in trade is their political connections, | 0:44:25 | 0:44:28 | |
that's, that's how they operate. | 0:44:28 | 0:44:33 | |
So it would have been par to the course that they went | 0:44:33 | 0:44:36 | |
straight to the top of the Northern Ireland Executive | 0:44:36 | 0:44:38 | |
when they became involved? | 0:44:38 | 0:44:39 | |
I think so. | 0:44:39 | 0:44:41 | |
That's their modus operandi. | 0:44:41 | 0:44:43 | |
Ian Coulter was also at the Stormont meeting. | 0:44:43 | 0:44:45 | |
Cerberus hired him and Pimco's other law firm, Brown Rudnick, | 0:44:45 | 0:44:47 | |
immediately after Pimco withdrew. | 0:44:47 | 0:44:51 | |
But Frank Cushnahan - who had turned out to be so toxic for the Pimco | 0:44:51 | 0:44:55 | |
deal - was apparently out. | 0:44:55 | 0:44:58 | |
Once again, Nama didn't know that potential purchasers were talking | 0:44:58 | 0:45:00 | |
to the DUP. | 0:45:00 | 0:45:06 | |
Cerberus then go to a meeting at Stormont, with the First | 0:45:06 | 0:45:09 | |
Minister, once again, Nama says they didn't know | 0:45:09 | 0:45:11 | |
anything about that either. | 0:45:11 | 0:45:17 | |
They should, of course, of course they should | 0:45:17 | 0:45:18 | |
have been on high alert, and I don't see any evidence | 0:45:18 | 0:45:21 | |
that they made any efforts to find out what was happening | 0:45:21 | 0:45:24 | |
in the background. | 0:45:24 | 0:45:25 | |
Three days after Cerberus came to Stormont, Peter Robinson | 0:45:25 | 0:45:27 | |
was on the phone to the Irish Finance Minister, | 0:45:27 | 0:45:29 | |
Michael Noonan. | 0:45:29 | 0:45:37 | |
What was that call about and why was it directed to your mobile | 0:45:37 | 0:45:40 | |
phone as opposed to going through the offices | 0:45:40 | 0:45:42 | |
of the First Minister - if you can recall? | 0:45:42 | 0:45:46 | |
I really cannot recall. | 0:45:46 | 0:45:55 | |
You say that that was after the meeting with Cerberus. | 0:45:55 | 0:45:57 | |
It could well have been to ask whether he was aware | 0:45:57 | 0:46:00 | |
of its interest. | 0:46:00 | 0:46:01 | |
I just cannot recall. | 0:46:01 | 0:46:02 | |
I have no recollection of it. | 0:46:02 | 0:46:03 | |
It could have been to ask for a meeting. | 0:46:03 | 0:46:05 | |
I am not sure whether any meeting took place. | 0:46:05 | 0:46:07 | |
Indeed, it could have been about an Ireland rugby match. | 0:46:07 | 0:46:10 | |
I just do not know. | 0:46:10 | 0:46:11 | |
I would need to check. | 0:46:11 | 0:46:14 | |
Dublin's Department of Finance told us the phone call was about | 0:46:14 | 0:46:17 | |
the Northern Ireland sale, but no record of it was kept. | 0:46:17 | 0:46:24 | |
We asked Peter Robinson if he was promoting Cerberus. | 0:46:24 | 0:46:26 | |
He told us Ministers never promoted any particular company. | 0:46:26 | 0:46:32 | |
He said, "Which firm succeeded was unimportant to us." | 0:46:32 | 0:46:38 | |
Two weeks later, Cerberus made their bid. | 0:46:38 | 0:46:41 | |
The reserve price was ?1.3 billion. | 0:46:41 | 0:46:43 | |
Cerberus bid ?100,000 more. | 0:46:43 | 0:46:51 | |
I tell you what, it's being sold tonight. | 0:46:51 | 0:46:53 | |
They were the only company willing to meet Nama's asking price. | 0:46:53 | 0:46:56 | |
The gavel's up. | 0:46:56 | 0:46:57 | |
I'm selling once. | 0:46:57 | 0:46:58 | |
Twice. | 0:46:58 | 0:46:59 | |
Third. | 0:46:59 | 0:47:01 | |
It turned out to be the Irish taxpayer's biggest single loss | 0:47:01 | 0:47:04 | |
on a Nama loan sale. | 0:47:04 | 0:47:12 | |
Cerberus accepted one important condition from Nama. | 0:47:12 | 0:47:14 | |
They said they wouldn't pay any current or former Nama, | 0:47:14 | 0:47:16 | |
which would include Frank Cushnahan. | 0:47:16 | 0:47:25 | |
But Frank Cushnahan says he was still secretly involved | 0:47:25 | 0:47:27 | |
in the deal. | 0:47:27 | 0:47:28 | |
He says he worked with Ian Coulter to land Cerberus. | 0:47:28 | 0:47:38 | |
You know the, when I was working on that Cerberus thing to get that | 0:47:42 | 0:47:49 | |
Cushnahan says his role in the work was deliberately hidden | 0:47:55 | 0:47:57 | |
because of Nama's objections. | 0:47:57 | 0:48:03 | |
While Cerberus celebrated their purchase with Peter Robinson | 0:48:35 | 0:48:37 | |
and Martin McGuinness, the fund paid ?15 million | 0:48:37 | 0:48:39 | |
to Brown Rudnick and ?7.5 million of that was paid on to Tughans. | 0:48:39 | 0:48:49 | |
And Ian Coulter moved ?6 million to an Isle of Man bank account, | 0:48:49 | 0:48:53 | |
out of the firm's reach. | 0:48:53 | 0:48:57 | |
Tughans won't talk to us, but it seems like the partners' | 0:48:57 | 0:49:00 | |
dispute with Ian Coulter came from the suggestion that the fee | 0:49:00 | 0:49:04 | |
would be shared with Frank Cushnahan. | 0:49:04 | 0:49:07 | |
Solicitors aren't allowed to share legal fees with someone who isn't | 0:49:07 | 0:49:09 | |
another lawyer, as the Law Society told MLAs. | 0:49:09 | 0:49:16 | |
Hypothetically, a solicitor cannot share fees with | 0:49:16 | 0:49:17 | |
an unqualified person. | 0:49:17 | 0:49:19 | |
That is a breach of the Order and constitutes a crime. | 0:49:19 | 0:49:22 | |
That is absolute. | 0:49:22 | 0:49:30 | |
So was the money transferred to the Isle of Man intended | 0:49:30 | 0:49:32 | |
for Frank Cushnahan? | 0:49:32 | 0:49:36 | |
We know it was - because Frank Cushnahan said so. | 0:49:36 | 0:49:44 | |
In the meeting, Frank Cushnahan tells David Gray that Ian Coulter | 0:49:44 | 0:49:49 | |
moved the money into a temporary holding account, known as an escrow | 0:49:49 | 0:49:52 | |
account, in order to secure it for Cushnahan's fixer's fee. | 0:49:52 | 0:49:57 | |
He actually moved six million of it into an escrow account. | 0:49:57 | 0:49:59 | |
Last year Frank Cushnahan told Spotlight | 0:50:15 | 0:50:17 | |
he categorically denied seeking money from Pimco, | 0:50:17 | 0:50:18 | |
Cerberus, Tughans or Ian Coulter. | 0:50:18 | 0:50:19 | |
But here, he says the opposite. | 0:50:19 | 0:50:21 | |
Coulter moved ?6 million in order to pay him for the deal. | 0:50:21 | 0:50:27 | |
"He did that because he was then able to say, "there's this, | 0:50:27 | 0:50:30 | |
Cushnahan's done all this work, therefore, he's entitled | 0:50:30 | 0:50:35 | |
to his fee." Frank Cushnahan was the thread running | 0:50:35 | 0:50:37 | |
through the entire sales process. | 0:50:37 | 0:50:39 | |
He was one of the architects of the initial offer. | 0:50:39 | 0:50:42 | |
He was an advisor to the sellers. | 0:50:42 | 0:50:46 | |
He was also an advisor to the developers who would benefit | 0:50:46 | 0:50:48 | |
from the deal. | 0:50:48 | 0:50:49 | |
And at the end, despite specific assurances that he would not be | 0:50:49 | 0:50:52 | |
paid, he was there claiming he had worked on the final deal and saying | 0:50:52 | 0:50:55 | |
he deserved to be paid. | 0:50:55 | 0:51:01 | |
Our recording also revealed one curious episode involving a senior | 0:51:04 | 0:51:09 | |
Nama executive. | 0:51:09 | 0:51:12 | |
During Frank Cushnahan's lunch, he brings up the name Ronnie, | 0:51:12 | 0:51:16 | |
which we understand to be Ronnie Hanna, | 0:51:16 | 0:51:19 | |
a former bank official from Northern Ireland who became | 0:51:19 | 0:51:22 | |
Nama's head of asset recovery. | 0:51:22 | 0:51:26 | |
Cushnahan suggests Ronnie Hanna saved developers from Nama | 0:51:26 | 0:51:30 | |
going under - saying he prevented people's lights going out. | 0:51:30 | 0:51:37 | |
I mean, people's lights would have been out except for him. | 0:51:40 | 0:51:43 | |
I mean that sincerely. | 0:51:43 | 0:51:44 | |
John Miskelly, one of the developers caught up in Nama, then makes | 0:51:44 | 0:51:47 | |
a startling revelation. | 0:51:47 | 0:51:50 | |
He says he was told to contact Frank Cushnahan | 0:51:50 | 0:51:52 | |
by the First Minister's son, Gareth Robinson, who now runs | 0:51:52 | 0:51:57 | |
a PR company. | 0:51:57 | 0:52:06 | |
Ronnie Hanna told us it would be "wholly inappropriate" for him | 0:52:18 | 0:52:22 | |
to comment because there is a criminal investigation ongoing. | 0:52:22 | 0:52:25 | |
He left Nama six months after the sale and now runs | 0:52:25 | 0:52:28 | |
a consultancy outside Belfast. | 0:52:28 | 0:52:32 | |
Gareth Robinson did not respond to questions we put to him. | 0:52:32 | 0:52:37 | |
Frank Cushnahan did write to us, but did not address the alleged | 0:52:37 | 0:52:41 | |
phone call to Ronnie Hanna. | 0:52:41 | 0:52:50 | |
Detectives from the National Crime Agency are investigating | 0:52:50 | 0:52:54 | |
the Nama sale. | 0:52:54 | 0:52:56 | |
As long as that investigation continues, many of the key people | 0:52:56 | 0:52:59 | |
in this programme say they cannot answer our questions. | 0:52:59 | 0:53:05 | |
Sammy Wilson told us that the police are "more capable of dealing | 0:53:05 | 0:53:08 | |
with this issue than sensation seeking biased BBC reporters are." | 0:53:08 | 0:53:14 | |
He said we were seeking "to titillate the public | 0:53:14 | 0:53:18 | |
"with the kind of half-baked and biased reporting which has been | 0:53:18 | 0:53:22 | |
"the mark of Spotlight in the past." Peter Robinson told us he gave | 0:53:22 | 0:53:27 | |
a detailed statement to Stormont's Finance Committee | 0:53:27 | 0:53:30 | |
and answered all their questions. | 0:53:30 | 0:53:34 | |
He also he wanted to meet the NCA to help them in any way he could, | 0:53:34 | 0:53:39 | |
saying such matters should be left to professional investigators rather | 0:53:39 | 0:53:41 | |
than a TV programme. | 0:53:41 | 0:53:46 | |
Frank Cushnahan's lawyer told us it would be inappropriate for him | 0:53:46 | 0:53:50 | |
to comment while the NCA investigation is ongoing. | 0:53:50 | 0:53:55 | |
Ian Coulter was interviewed by the NCA last November. | 0:53:55 | 0:54:00 | |
He no longer practices law and now works as a director for one | 0:54:00 | 0:54:03 | |
of Northern Ireland's largest developers. | 0:54:03 | 0:54:09 | |
He has said publicly that he transferred the money | 0:54:09 | 0:54:12 | |
to the Isle of Man for complex, commercially and legally sensitive | 0:54:12 | 0:54:15 | |
reasons. | 0:54:15 | 0:54:20 | |
And then there's this man - the biggest revelation of all. | 0:54:20 | 0:54:25 | |
John Miskelly, the County Down developer who joined | 0:54:25 | 0:54:27 | |
Frank Cushnahan for lunch. | 0:54:27 | 0:54:37 | |
Late yesterday John Miskelly told us that our account of his business | 0:54:40 | 0:54:47 | |
meeting with Frank Cushnahan and David Gray is "an accurate | 0:54:47 | 0:54:50 | |
and truthful" portrayal of everything that was said | 0:54:50 | 0:54:54 | |
that day. | 0:54:54 | 0:54:58 | |
Including his own recollection of how Gareth Robinson, | 0:54:58 | 0:55:00 | |
Frank Cushnahan and Ronnie Hanna protected him from having his | 0:55:00 | 0:55:03 | |
lights put out by Nama. | 0:55:03 | 0:55:06 | |
John Miskelly has also given Spotlight a statement | 0:55:06 | 0:55:09 | |
in which he says he has been gathering his own detailed | 0:55:09 | 0:55:13 | |
and extensive evidence over several years which he says implicates other | 0:55:13 | 0:55:15 | |
individuals in financial misconduct. | 0:55:15 | 0:55:20 | |
We understand much of the evidence concerns the sale of | 0:55:20 | 0:55:22 | |
the Northern Ireland Nama portfolio. | 0:55:22 | 0:55:32 | |
John Miskelly told us... | 0:55:40 | 0:55:49 | |
We can also reveal that John Miskelly's | 0:55:49 | 0:55:51 | |
evidence in relation to the Nama Northern Ireland sale | 0:55:51 | 0:55:53 | |
has just been handed over to the Securities | 0:55:53 | 0:55:55 | |
and Exchange Commission, a powerful American financial watch dog. | 0:55:55 | 0:56:01 | |
John Miskelly told us... | 0:56:01 | 0:56:11 | |
He also said... | 0:56:18 | 0:56:21 | |
We understand Mr Miskelly has also | 0:56:27 | 0:56:28 | |
contacted the National Crime Agency in Belfast. | 0:56:28 | 0:56:30 | |
Northern Ireland's biggest ever property sale is about to turn | 0:56:30 | 0:56:32 | |
into its biggest financial and political scandal. | 0:56:32 | 0:56:42 | |
I'm Vincent Kearney, I'm home affairs correspondent | 0:56:56 | 0:56:59 | |
for BBC News NI. | 0:56:59 | 0:57:00 | |
Home affairs covers a huge range of subjects. | 0:57:00 | 0:57:03 |