Browse content similar to 26/07/2014. Check below for episodes and series from the same categories and more!
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have been detained at the border with Mexico, mostly in drug`related | :00:00. | :00:00. | |
violence and poverty. Now, it is time for Click. | :00:00. | :00:10. | |
Hi, just to let you know, I am male and I really like watches. I work in | :00:11. | :00:16. | |
London, but I pass by here every weekend. I am 41 years old, but I am | :00:17. | :00:18. | |
a massive fan of One Direction. Your movements, your habits, your | :00:19. | :00:33. | |
interests. Welcome to Click, I am Spencer | :00:34. | :00:45. | |
Kelly, and welcome to York. This is an ancient English city, but it is | :00:46. | :00:48. | |
doing some 21st`century things. Of the millions of tourists who visit | :00:49. | :00:51. | |
here every year, more and more want to go online while they are here | :00:52. | :00:55. | |
using their smartphones, and York is one of the first UK cities to offer | :00:56. | :00:58. | |
its own citywide free Wi`Fi. Now, I say free, but we'll know what they | :00:59. | :01:02. | |
say about free lunches, there are none. So, do you wonder what you are | :01:03. | :01:09. | |
giving up when you go online? These dots are shop customers, moving | :01:10. | :01:12. | |
around the store in real time. It is actually their mobiles that are | :01:13. | :01:14. | |
being tracked, and it is happening without their owners' knowledge. | :01:15. | :01:19. | |
When your device is searching for a Wi`Fi network, it repeatedly | :01:20. | :01:21. | |
broadcasts short pings of information, which includes its MAC | :01:22. | :01:33. | |
address, a numerical code. The system listens for the pings and by | :01:34. | :01:36. | |
triangulating their Origin it can get tricky accurate idea of where | :01:37. | :01:39. | |
you have been, even if you never actually connect to the Wi`Fi. From | :01:40. | :01:47. | |
this location map, we know exactly where a lot of people are spending | :01:48. | :01:51. | |
time, and we can filter the data, how many minutes they are spending. | :01:52. | :01:55. | |
For example, if they are spending three minutes in the chilled area, | :01:56. | :02:06. | |
that helps us to improve the area. Although the system doesn't tell it | :02:07. | :02:09. | |
anything about you, as soon as you connect to the free Wi`Fi offered | :02:10. | :02:18. | |
everything changes. When you login with Facebook, Twitter, or an e`mail | :02:19. | :02:21. | |
address, all of that historic location data is then linked to your | :02:22. | :02:29. | |
profile, to you. And it is not just within the walls of the shop at the | :02:30. | :02:33. | |
Wi`Fi system logs data, it also picks up thousands of passers`by | :02:34. | :02:36. | |
everyday, many of whom may never enter the shop at all. Now, this | :02:37. | :02:44. | |
system works in something the size of a shop, but in York, the | :02:45. | :02:47. | |
analytics company behind it, Purple WiFi, is planning something on a | :02:48. | :02:55. | |
much larger scale. By 2015, it is hoping to install the same tracking | :02:56. | :02:58. | |
technology across whole parts of the city. Unlike the shop`based system, | :02:59. | :03:05. | |
at the moment it is still quite limited, and only tracks your rough | :03:06. | :03:08. | |
location, even once you have logged on. Even that information is proving | :03:09. | :03:15. | |
useful to the York council. It is early days, but already we can | :03:16. | :03:17. | |
actually tell the people who are using the Wi`Fi, where they are | :03:18. | :03:21. | |
coming from in terms of Origin, and where they are going inside York. It | :03:22. | :03:26. | |
gives us a better insight into the foot fall. We see a vast number of | :03:27. | :03:32. | |
people who are logging on are middle`aged females from outside the | :03:33. | :03:38. | |
UK. When the full location tracking and profile system goes live next | :03:39. | :03:42. | |
year, the deal will be this. You get free Wi`Fi in exchange for | :03:43. | :03:45. | |
information about who you are and where you have been. So, is this a | :03:46. | :03:53. | |
fair trade? Purple WiFi's boss told me that you would see plenty of | :03:54. | :03:57. | |
benefits if you are willing to give up that information. In a city type | :03:58. | :04:02. | |
scenario, like this, it is understanding where the choke points | :04:03. | :04:05. | |
are, where is the traffic of people, how do they move? If you take it a | :04:06. | :04:10. | |
step forward you can take that data and control lighting or parking. Why | :04:11. | :04:15. | |
are the lights on if there are no people there? It does mean that | :04:16. | :04:18. | |
before you log onto the Wi`Fi you don't have so much information about | :04:19. | :04:20. | |
that particular device's movements, which I guess is annoying. It is and | :04:21. | :04:27. | |
it isn't. There is a value in understanding how devices generally | :04:28. | :04:29. | |
move around, because we get anonymous data, so that is useful. | :04:30. | :04:34. | |
Where it becomes really useful is once we know more about you, your | :04:35. | :04:37. | |
age, social interests, gender, who you are friends with, that is when | :04:38. | :04:41. | |
we can start to push hyper local relevant information. Here is the | :04:42. | :04:51. | |
thing. Remember this system can match personal information to your | :04:52. | :04:54. | |
device's movement before you log onto the network? Well, Purple WiFi | :04:55. | :04:59. | |
is planning to keep that location data for up to a year. How do you | :05:00. | :05:05. | |
think people will feel about you knowing that? We won't be tracking | :05:06. | :05:11. | |
you for 12 months, we are tracking a device. A device that you now know | :05:12. | :05:17. | |
is mine. Absolutely. Every bit of feedback is that if you are giving | :05:18. | :05:21. | |
me something relevant, I am happy. If you are sending me a load of | :05:22. | :05:26. | |
spam, don't bother. All this information is there in the terms | :05:27. | :05:29. | |
and conditions that need to be accepted before you logon. You know, | :05:30. | :05:35. | |
those terms and conditions, the ones that we all read thoroughly before | :05:36. | :05:38. | |
we click OK... You think people actually read them? Do you think | :05:39. | :06:00. | |
that clicking 'Yes' to terms and conditions goes far enough? I think | :06:01. | :06:04. | |
so. There is a value trade. You will get a free Wi`Fi, which comes at a | :06:05. | :06:07. | |
small trade of your personal information. Is there an option for | :06:08. | :06:11. | |
people who use the Wi`Fi being able to opt out of having their | :06:12. | :06:13. | |
information tracked? No. I don't think there should be. It is a fair | :06:14. | :06:18. | |
exchange. There is a cost to put the equipment, the overlay of software, | :06:19. | :06:22. | |
and it is a fair exchange value. You want free Wi`Fi up because you don't | :06:23. | :06:25. | |
want to use up your data. The exchange value is that you will | :06:26. | :06:38. | |
share that data. These insights are only possible because of a unique | :06:39. | :06:40. | |
combination of location information and demographic social media | :06:41. | :06:42. | |
information. The harvesting of anonymous device information is | :06:43. | :06:45. | |
described as a grey area in terms of data protection. Last year, the city | :06:46. | :06:50. | |
of London banned Wi`Fi enabled dustbins installed on public | :06:51. | :06:53. | |
streets, after it emerged that they were logging MAC addresses is in a | :06:54. | :06:55. | |
similar way, without getting explicit consent from passers`by. | :06:56. | :07:09. | |
Although you just heard Gavin Wheeldon tell me he didn't think | :07:10. | :07:13. | |
there should be an option to opt out of having your MAC address recorded, | :07:14. | :07:15. | |
after our interview, Purple WiFi got back in touch with us and said they | :07:16. | :07:19. | |
may consider an opt out system. I'm not sure how definite that sounds to | :07:20. | :07:29. | |
you, but anyway... This issue of opting out has already reared its | :07:30. | :07:32. | |
head in the US. We went to Washington to investigate something | :07:33. | :07:34. | |
called the Wireless Registry, which may allow you to take back control | :07:35. | :07:37. | |
of the data associated with your phone. | :07:38. | :07:39. | |
If the idea of constant retail tracking doesn't appeal to you, what | :07:40. | :07:45. | |
can you do about it? As we have seen, your phone sends out a unique | :07:46. | :07:52. | |
identifier called a MAC address. One start`up, called the Wireless | :07:53. | :07:55. | |
Registry, wants to help people take back control of what it calls your | :07:56. | :07:58. | |
proximal identity, the signals you commit from your smartphone. We are | :07:59. | :08:02. | |
allowing people to take control of their signal and decide what is | :08:03. | :08:06. | |
associated with it. The idea is to allow people to take control of | :08:07. | :08:09. | |
their smartphone identity, they can register and decide what is | :08:10. | :08:20. | |
associated with the identity. With the Wireless Registry, you can | :08:21. | :08:23. | |
choose to opt out of having their data associated with your MAC | :08:24. | :08:25. | |
address tracked. It has created the platform, smartstoreprivacy.org, | :08:26. | :08:28. | |
where you can enter your MAC address for Wi`Fi and Bluetooth, and a range | :08:29. | :08:31. | |
of major retail traders say they won't track your information. This | :08:32. | :08:43. | |
code of conduct is being followed, which is focused at American users, | :08:44. | :08:46. | |
but the wireless register wants to take it around the world. We have | :08:47. | :09:00. | |
intended from day one to be global. We take every character set around | :09:01. | :09:04. | |
the world, and we are in discussions globally, and we think that is just | :09:05. | :09:08. | |
another barrier that has been in the way in the past for developers. In | :09:09. | :09:17. | |
the US, where you don't have general data protection rights to protect | :09:18. | :09:20. | |
you against this kind of tracking, the Wireless Registry opt out is a | :09:21. | :09:24. | |
step forward. I do think that most people won't be aware that the | :09:25. | :09:26. | |
technology is being used at all, never mind that they have to go and | :09:27. | :09:30. | |
register with a specific opt out registry. Not only do people not | :09:31. | :09:34. | |
know where to look, but when you do find information about privacy it | :09:35. | :09:38. | |
can be confusing. People are campaigning to make privacy terms | :09:39. | :09:40. | |
and conditions associated with websites much more readable and | :09:41. | :10:00. | |
transparent. A recent study by Deloitte said it would take the | :10:01. | :10:03. | |
average user up to 31 hours per year to properly read through the terms. | :10:04. | :10:07. | |
I don't think it is wrong to say that so long as there is a privacy | :10:08. | :10:10. | |
policy that someone has clicked OK to, they have consented to | :10:11. | :10:13. | |
everything in it. In recent weeks we heard Apple was working on creating | :10:14. | :10:16. | |
a new privacy platform for its iOS8 operating system. It will randomise | :10:17. | :10:19. | |
MAC addresses, so the unique identifier may be different every | :10:20. | :10:22. | |
time. If they go ahead with it, it could be a huge blow for retail data | :10:23. | :10:25. | |
collection. Of course, you could just turn off your blue Bluetooth | :10:26. | :10:29. | |
and Wi`Fi on your phone. That is not what the Wireless Registry wants you | :10:30. | :10:34. | |
to do. As well as the opt out option, there is an opt in, allowing | :10:35. | :10:37. | |
you to share your personal data and control the wireless identity you | :10:38. | :10:43. | |
broadcast around you. I signed up and created my own hotspot and | :10:44. | :10:48. | |
linked my social networks to it. We can attach your LinkedIn, Facebook | :10:49. | :10:50. | |
and Twitter to your wireless signal, so any time you want someone to pick | :10:51. | :10:55. | |
it up by being in proximity to you, they can see your social media. I | :10:56. | :11:02. | |
can click on your Twitter and would be able to follow your feed just by | :11:03. | :11:07. | |
being within proximity. While it appear strange to some that a | :11:08. | :11:10. | |
stranger could sit next to you and see so much personal data, at least | :11:11. | :11:13. | |
now there are systems emerging that allow us to control what other | :11:14. | :11:24. | |
people say. That is it for the short version, if you want more, go to | :11:25. | :11:30. | |
either player. The full version of the programme is there right now. We | :11:31. | :11:34. | |
will see you next time. | :11:35. | :11:37. |